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INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE B ETWEEN AUTHORS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
By Dawn C. Nunziato1
Introduction
Authors’ copyright rights have traditionally been limited, because such limitations
were believed to be necessary to advance copyright law’s constitutionally-mandated
utilitarian purpose -- “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” 2 But
authors today – especially authors of digital works – are increasingly turning to extracopyright measures, including encryption and “clickwrap” licenses, to customize their
rights in their works of authorship. Because such privately-ordered rights are (arguably)
outside of copyright law’s framework, they are not necessarily subject to its utilitarian
mandate, and need not be made subject to limitations imposed by copyright law on
authors’ rights. Yet even though such private ordering regimes may not be subject to
copyright law’s utilitarian mandate justifying limitations on authors’ rights, other
powerful justifications implicit in the copyright regime support the imposition of
limitations on authors’ rights. In this Article, I advance one such theoretical justification.
Building upon the foundational work of John Rawls, who has articulated a theory of
justice as “fairness,” I develop a theory of justice between generations of authors. This
theory requires that the rights of each generation of authors – including the rights that
they might attempt to assert through private ordering measures – be limited for the
benefit of subsequent generations of authors.
1
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While not limited to authors’ rights in digital works, the theory of
intergenerational justice between authors that I advance is particularly relevant to the
burgeoning private ordering regime, in which authors of digital works are increasingly
using private ordering measures to create for themselves virtually unlimited rights – in
disregard of the interests of future generations of authors – even while they are benefiting
from the limitations copyright law has imposed on the rights of their predecessor
generation of authors. Authors of electronic books, for example, are increasingly using
“clickwrap” licenses and encryption controls to prohibit their readers from copying any
portion of their books, even while these authors have benefited from incorporating
elements of earlier works into their own works. Motion picture companies are
increasingly using technological measures like encryption devices to control access to
and copying of their films released on DVD, even while the filmmakers have benefited
from copying elements of earlier works in developing their films. By the use of such
private ordering measures, present-day authors are able to reap the benefits of the
limitations on authors’ rights previously imposed by copyright law, while casting aside
any limitations on their rights for the benefit of future authors. I contend that the use of
such private ordering measures to establish unlimited rights in creative works is
inconsistent with intergenerational justice obligations imposed upon authors to preserve
the raw materials of the creative process for the benefit of future generations of authors.
In Part I of this Article, I set forth the principal tenets of a general theory of
intergenerational justice, drawing from the work of John Rawls. As part of his general
theory of justice as fairness, Rawls outlines a theory of justice between generations and a
2

The Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright and patent statutes “to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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“just savings” principle according to which the generation into which one is born is and
should be rendered morally irrelevant. Under this theory of justice between generations,
the distribution of benefits and burdens made available by cooperation in society is to be
determined without reference to an individual’s temporal priority along the timeline of
society. In particular, individuals deliberating in a Rawlsian “original position” are
charged with choosing a principle of intergenerational savings that they would want all
previous generations to have followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how
far backward or forward in time. Regulated by a principle of intergenerational savings,
individuals within each generation are obliged to forgo immediate gains that are available
to them where necessary to protect the interests of future generations.
Although intergenerational justice concerns have frequently animated debates in
the environmental sphere, such concerns have yet to be articulated in the intellectual
property arena. In Part II, I apply the general principles of intergenerational justice
articulated in Part I to intellectual property rights in creative works. In Part II(A), I
explore the interests and motivations of authors in an initial choice situation where no
information is available to them as to which generation along the timeline of society they
belonged. I contend that, behind such a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, authors would opt
for a system of required savings of creative works, which would translate into substantial
limitations on authors’ rights in their works. Because authors deliberating in this initial
choice situation would not know whether they belonged to an earlier or later creative
generation and because such authors would likely believe that the creative process entails
the incorporation of some elements and uses of predecessors’ works, they would find it in
their interests to limit authors’ rights in their creative works across the board. In
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exploring the interests and incentives operating upon authors deliberating behind the veil
of ignorance, I consider in Part II(B) the economic analysis of authors’ rights advanced
by William Landes and Richard Posner. Landes and Posner’s analysis, while emanating
from a different theoretical framework, provides further support for the claim that authors
would agree ex ante to limitations on their rights for the benefit of the creative enterprise
in the long run.
In Part II(C), I anticipate and address some objections to this theory of
intergenerational justice in general and mandated intergenerational savings of elements of
creative works in particular. Richard Epstein, for one, contends that any system of
mandated intergenerational savings is inferior to an unfettered market based on strong
property rights in which we simply rely upon individuals’ natural predisposition to save
for the benefit of their progeny. While Epstein may be correct that we can and should
generally rely upon individuals’ natural inclinations to save for their progeny, I contend
that such reliance is likely to be inadequate with respect to the particular case of
intergenerational savings by authors for the benefit of subsequent authors.
In Part III, I take a fresh look at the limitations historically imposed by copyright
law on authors’ rights from the perspective of intergenerational justice between authors.
Although Congress and the courts have not explicitly adverted to principles of
intergenerational justice in justifying limitations on creators’ rights, such themes can be
seen to inhere in the jurisprudence of copyright limitations. Specifically, the limitations
imposed on the term of copyright protection, as well as limitations imposed by copyright
law’s idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine, have the effect of mandating the
“savings” of certain elements and uses of the creative process for the benefit of future
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authors, at the expense of present authors. In myriad circumstances in which authors
have sought to wield their exclusive rights in ways that would fail to preserve the raw
materials of the creative process for subsequent generations of authors, copyright law has
imposed significant limitations on creators’ rights. Because present authors acting in
their own interests do not have sufficient incentive to “save” for the benefit of future
authors, copyright law has traditionally mandated the savings of certain elements and
uses of authors’ creative works for the benefit of future authors.
As I explore in Part IV, however, private ordering regimes for structuring authors’
rights, including those enabled by technological and contractual measures, embody no
similar mandate of intergenerational savings. With the use of technological measures
such as encryption controls that prohibit any and all copying of encrypted creative works,
and of “clickwrap” licenses that create perpetual rights in works and require users to
waive their fair use and other rights in such works, we are transitioning into a regime in
which the present generation of authors can benefit from the intergenerational savings
scheme previously embodied in copyright law, without in turn having to suffer
limitations on their own rights for the benefit of subsequent authors. Within the incipient
private ordering regime, each creator is able to decide for herself, using her private
calculus of benefits and harms, how to design her rights in her creative work, including
whether to permit subsequent authors to make use of any portion of her work. The
danger thus arises that present authors will choose to maximize their returns on their
creative works at the expense of subsequent generations of authors, whose interests will
not be adequately taken into account. By enabling each author essentially to determine
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for herself the scope and duration of her rights, private ordering regimes fail to account
for the interests of future generations of authors.
In the recently enacted Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 3 Congress empowered
authors to use technological measures, such as encryption controls, to create for
themselves virtually unlimited rights in their works. Although such rights are subject to
minor limitations, these limitations are insufficient to protect the interests of future
generations of creators, as I discuss in Part IV(A). Furthermore, authors are increasingly
resorting to contractual measures, such as clickwrap licenses, to create for themselves
broad, perpetual rights in their works. A newly promulgated uniform statute – the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act4 – already adopted in several states,
provides a framework for the creation of broad, perpetual rights in certain types of
creative works. And courts that have been called upon to enforce essentially unlimited
contractual rights for authors generally have been unwilling to read any limitations into
such privately ordered rights, as I discuss in Part IV(B).
Finally, in Part V, I contend that in order to carry forth into the digital realm the
commitment to justice between generations of authors that is implicit in the copyright
regime, Congress and the courts should continue to impose substantial limitations on
authors’ rights, whether protected by public or private ordering measures. Although the
migration of creative works to the digital realm may require some recalibration of the
limitations historically imposed on creators’ rights, intergenerational justice concerns
require that the interests of future generations of authors should be protected, as they
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Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, Section 1 (short title).
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traditionally have been in the copyright regime, by mandating savings of components of
earlier authors’ creative works. Toward this end, I propose several ways in which
limitations should be imposed on authors’ privately ordered rights so as to embody a
form of intergenerational justice between authors in the digital age.

I.

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF INTERGENERATIONAL J USTICE
A.

Introduction

The subject of intergenerational justice, while touched upon in the works of
theorists over the past several centuries, 5 has been explicitly examined only recently. 6
Theorists throughout the centuries exploring issues of distributive justice have primarily
focused on the subject of intragenerational justice – that is, how to establish a just social
system for allocating the benefits and burdens of social cooperation among individuals
existing in society at any given time and belonging roughly to the same generation. 7
Beginning in the 1950s and 60s, however, theorists focusing on issues such as the
mistreatment of non-renewable environmental resources, the rapid growth of the world
5

Throughout the past centuries, only a handful of thinkers have hinted at the issue of
intergenerational justice. Edmund Burke, writing in 1790, opined that:
Society is indeed a contract . . . a partnership in all art, a particular in every virtue, and in
all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations,
it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who
are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790). Nineteenth Century
philosopher Henry Sidgwick also alluded to concerns of intergenerational justice, when he asked:
“How far are we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of
existing human beings? . . . [T]he time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his
happiness from a universal point of view; and . . . interests of posterity must concern a utilitarian
as much as those of his contemporaries . . . .” HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 385
(MacMillan 1962).
6
See generally P ETER LASLETT & J AMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND
GENERATIONS 1-23 (1992).
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population, and the funding of an ongoing system of social security, began to consider
whether and to what extent concerns of intergenerational justice served to impose
limitations on the rights of those in the present generation in the interests of those to be
born into future generations. 8 Such intergenerational theories of justice examined
whether and how the rights of those in present generations should be limited to safeguard
the interests of those in generations to come. 9
In essence, the intergenerational justice inquiry sets off in two directions. First,
from the perspective of the present generation, we may ask, what is it reasonable for us to
expect from the previous generation – in the way of sacrifices made on our behalf, either
in the form of savings for our benefit or actions taken to prevent harm from being visited
upon our generation. Prospectively, the question becomes, what limitations on our rights
would be reasonable to impose in the interests of generations to come? For all but the
very first and last generations in the timeline of society, the intergenerational justice
inquiry is both forward-looking and backward-looking, and can be structured as a
hypothetical tripartite contract between (1) the present generation; (2) the preceding
generation(s); and (3) the succeeding generation(s). As Peter Laslett observes regarding
the structure of this tripartite contract, “If each successive generation is regarded as
having both rights and duties, then the rights that any given generation (here generation
2) has in its predecessor (generation 1) are met by the duties it performs for its successor

7

See generally Laslett & Fishkin, supra note 6, at 14-22.
See, e.g., Martin Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 U.C.L.A. L. R EV. 443
(1968); Martin Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, 56 MONIST 85 (1972); R. I. SIKORA
AND BRIAN BARRY, EDS., OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
9
Id.
8
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(generation 3).

[As such], the rights a generation has in preceding generations are

matched by the duties that have to be performed toward generations yet to come.”10

B. Intergenerational Justice and Rawls’ Theory of Justice
In developing the outlines of a general theory of intergenerational justice, I begin
with John Rawls’ groundbreaking treatment of this subject in his 1971 treatise A Theory
of Justice.11 In order to benefit from Rawls’ substantial contributions toward a theory of
intergenerational justice, it will be necessary to first review the fundamental elements of
Rawls’ theory of justice, which he denominates “justice as fairness.” 12 After briefly
reviewing the basic structure of Rawls’ theory of justice, I then focus in detail on Rawls’
treatment of intergenerational justice and intergenerational savings in particular.
1. The Subject of Justice in A Theory of Justice
The primary subject of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is that of social justice
– i.e., the manner in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and
duties and determine the division of advantages and disadvantages that result from social
cooperation. 13 According to Rawls, justice is and must be conceptualized as the most
important virtue of the major social institutions. 14 If a social institution is not just, it must
be restructured or reformulated to render it just. 15 The major social institutions that
comprise the subject of justice include the principal economic and social arrangements of
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Laslett & Fishkin, supra note 6, at 26.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
12
Id. at 3.
13
Id. at 4-7. See also id. at 54-58.
14
Id. at 3.
15
Id. at 3.
11
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society, including the legal protection of freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, and
– notably for our purposes -- systems of property. 16 Given that intellectual property is an
increasingly significant component of the private property system, it is worthwhile to
explore the implications of justice as fairness in general – and intergenerational justice in
particular -- for systems of intellectual property.
2. The Original Position and the Two Principles of Justice
Rawls first attempts to derive a set of principles for assigning the rights and duties
in the major social institutions and for defining the appropriate distribution of the benefits
and burdens that result from social cooperation. 17 He expounds a theory of an initial
position of equality among individuals in society by elaborating upon and “carry[ing] to a
higher level of abstraction” the social contract – the traditional expository device of
political philosophers. 18 Generalizing from earlier social contract theories, Rawls
develops a theory of an initial choice situation in order to elicit the principles that free
and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial
position of equality defining the fundamental terms of their association. 19 In developing
a theory of justice and exploring the fair terms of social cooperation, Rawls first imposes
certain limits or constraints on arguments in the initial choice situation that embody the
foundational elements of justice as fairness. The “original position” – the most favorable
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Id. at 7, 55.
Id. at 4-5.
18
Rawls presents a conception of justice as fairness that “generalizes and carries to a higher level
of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract,” id. at 11, as found in the theories of
political philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Within Rawls’ theory, the original
position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social
contract. Id. at 12.
19
Id. at 11.
17
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interpretation of the initial situation20 – is an expository device that imposes certain
constraints on arguments for arriving at the fair terms of social cooperation. These
constraints are imposed by virtue of the “veil of ignorance,” 21 behind which individuals
formulate arguments and deliberate regarding the principles of justice, and behind which
it is not possible for individuals to tailor the principles of justice to favor their own social
or natural circumstances. Thus, behind the veil of ignorance, in bargaining over the
proper distribution of the benefits and burdens resulting from social cooperation,
individuals cannot know their place in society, class position, social status, race, gender,
intelligence, strength, or other aspects of their fortune in the distribution of natural or
social assets or abilities. 22 Nor can they know their own detailed conception of the good
or particulars of their rational plans of life. 23 Given this lack of knowledge regarding
individual features and characteristics, no one in the original position can design the
principles of justice to favor his or her particular conditions or circumstances. 24
Knowledge of such characteristics is shielded from the individuals deliberating behind
the veil of ignorance because such social and natural circumstances are morally irrelevant
from the perspective of justice as fairness. 25 The veil of ignorance is therefore designed to
embody the constraint that these occluded features and characteristics are irrelevant, and
therefore should be made irrelevant, from the standpoint of justice. 26

20

Rawls defines the original position as the “interpretation of the initial situation that best
expresses the conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles
yet which, at the same time, leads to a conception that characterizes our considered judgments in
reflective equilibrium.” Id. at 121.
21
Id. at 18.
22
Id. at 136-42.
23
Id. at 136-37.
24
Id. at 139.
25
Id. at 141.
26
Id.
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The original position serves as an expository device that sums up the meaning of
the conditions we would be prepared to impose on arguments in formulating principles of
justice that will define the distribution of benefits and burdens resulting from social
cooperation. 27 In Rawls’ words:
We can, as it were, enter [the original position] at any moment simply by
conducting our moral reasoning about first principles in accordance with the
stipulated procedural constraints. . . . [The original position] is an attempt to
represent and unify the formal and general elements of our moral thought in a
manageable and vivid construction in order to use these elements to determine
which first principles of justice are the most reasonable. 28
The constraints in the original position are those that we would be prepared to regard as
limits on the fair terms of social cooperation. 29 As a result, the principles of justice that
are chosen in the original position are those that “rational persons concerned to advance
their own interests would consent to as equals, where none are known to be advantaged
or disadvantaged by social or natural contingencies.” 30
As discussed above, many features of the deliberating parties’ social and natural
characteristics are hidden from them in the initial choice situation. However, in order to
“generate the minimal motivations necessary to get a problem of rational choice going,” 31
the deliberating parties need to have some information available to them. Accordingly,
the individuals in the original position do know that they are motivated to increase their
share of “primary social goods”32 -- i.e., rights and liberties, opportunities and powers,
income and wealth33 – goods that will enable them to promote their own particular

27

Id. at 21.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 275 (1993). See also Rawls, supra note 11, at 19, 138.
29
Rawls, supra note 11, at 21.
30
Id. at 19.
31
See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 25 (1982).
32
Rawls, supra note 11, at 142-44.
33
Id. at 92-93.
28
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conception of the good most effectively, whatever it turns out to be. 34 Further, the
individuals deliberating behind the veil of ignorance are rational and mutually
disinterested 35 – i.e., they do not take an interest in one another’s interests and are not
motivated to advance the well-being of other individuals in society. 36 Rawls stipulates
further that the deliberating parties are risk-averse and concerned to minimize their worst
possible outcomes. 37 They also know that their society is subject to the circumstances of
justice – i.e., that many individuals coexist together in a definite geographical territory,
that their society is subject to moderate scarcity, and that they are capable of a sense of
justice. 38 Finally – and importantly for the subject of intergenerational justice – Rawls
posits, consistent with his present time of entry interpretation, 39 that the individuals
deliberating behind the veil know that they are contemporaries – all belonging to the
same generation – although they do not know the particular circumstances of their own
society, the level of culture it has been able to achieve, or to which generation in
particular they belong. 40 The parties deliberating behind the veil of ignorance “must
choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever
generation they turn out to belong to.” 41
Having set forth the circumstances of the original position as constraints on the
deliberating parties’ arguments, Rawls then establishes that the parties would select the

34

Id. at 144.
Id. at 139.
36
Id. at 13.
37
Id. at 152-61.
38
Id. at 126, 137, 145.
39
Id. at 140.
40
Id. at 136.
41
Id.
35
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following two fundamental principles of justice, 42 to be ranked and applied in “lexical
order”:43
(1)

each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for
all; and

(2)

social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with
the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 44

These two principles dictate that “all primary social goods are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored,” 45 consistent with the just savings principle.
3. The Principle of Intergenerational Justice and the Just Savings Principle
As discussed above, in A Theory of Justice Rawls provides the first extended
treatment of the subject of intergenerational justice, which he characterizes as among the
most difficult of the issues confronting any theory of justice. 46 In setting out the basic
contours of the principle of justice between generations, Rawls contends, first, that the
generation into which an individual is born is morally irrelevant from the perspective of
social justice: “In first principles of justice we are not allowed to treat generations
differently solely on the grounds that they are earlier or later in time.” 47 Therefore, the
major social institutions, including systems of property – and for our purposes, systems
of intellectual property -- must be structured so as to reflect this moral irrelevance.
42

Id. at 219.
Id. at 61, 63, 302.
44
Id. at 60, 302.
45
Id. at 303.
46
Rawls states that the problem of justice between generations subjects any ethical theory to
“severe if not impossible tests,” id. at 284, but that an account of distributive justice would be
incomplete without a discussion of this subject. Id.
43
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Whether an individual is born in 1950 or 2050 should not affect that individual’s
distribution of rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth. Rather,
we must view the life of a people as a “scheme of cooperation spread out in historical
time, . . . [which] is to be governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the
cooperation of contemporaries. [As such], no generation has stronger claims than any
other [to distribution of primary social goods].”48 Thus, the first important component of
Rawls’ principle of intergenerational justice is that the temporal priority of individuals –
i.e., when they arrive on the timeline of society – entails no moral priority, and should be
made morally irrelevant in structuring the major social institutions, including, for our
purposes, systems of intellectual property.
Because an individual’s temporal priority – like her gender, race, wealth, etc. -- is
morally irrelevant within Rawls’ theory of intergenerational justice, one might suppose
Rawls would design the circumstances of the original position so as to obscure from the
deliberating parties knowledge about which generation they belong to. If one’s
generational association along the timeline of society were obscured behind the veil of
ignorance, a deliberating party would not be permitted to adopt principles tending to
favor his generation, because he would not know to which generation he belonged.
Rawls, however, consistent with his “present time of entry” interpretation, 49 rejects the
idea of conceptualizing the original position as a “general assembly which includes at one
moment everyone who will live at some time [or] . . . as an assembly of everyone who

47

Id. at 295.
Id. at 289.
49
Id. at 140.
48
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could live at some time.” 50 Instead, he chooses to design the original position such that
the deliberating parties know that they are contemporaries – all belonging to the same
generation. 51
Because Rawls structures the original position such that the parties deliberating in
the original position know that they belong to the same generation, it is possible that the
parties would choose to disregard the interests of their successor generations – since no
one in the original position represents the interests of successor generations and since the
deliberating parties have an incentive to maximize their (and their generation’s) share of
primary social goods. 52 Yet, Rawls intends to design the circumstances of the original
position to reflect the principle that no generation has stronger claims than any other as to
the distribution of primary social goods. The deliberating parties’ knowledge that they all
belong to the same generation thus presents a theoretical difficulty with respect to the
design of the circumstances of the original position to generate principles that reflect
concerns of intergenerational justice. Put another way, Rawls intends to structure the
circumstances of the original position such that earlier generations will not choose
principles for distributing the benefits and burdens of social cooperation in disregard of
the interests of subsequent generations, and in particular, so that members of earlier
generations will bind themselves to save for the benefit of subsequent generations.
However, because the deliberating parties in the original position know that they all
belong to the same generation, adopting a savings principle can only hurt them. 53 This

50

Id. at 292, 139. Such an interpretation would “stretch fantasy too far [such that] the conception
would cease to be a natural guide to intuition.” Id. at 139.
51
Id. at 139.
52
Recall that the parties in the original position are presumed to be rational and mutually
disinterested. See text accompanying notes 35-36.
53
Rawls, supra note 11, at 292.
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presents the complication that, in arriving at the principles of justice and designing the
major social institutions, the deliberating parties might choose to favor their own
generation and decline to make any sacrifices at all for their successors. 54
Rawls first attempts to deal with this theoretical difficulty by introducing the
motivational assumption of “intergenerational care” 55 as operating on the deliberating
parties, which reflects our natural tendency to care for the well-being of our immediate
descendents. Pursuant to this motivational assumption, Rawls posits that each person
deliberating in the original position cares about the well-being of some of those in the
next generation: “The parties are regarded as representing family lines . . . with ties of
sentiment between successive generations.” 56 Thus, “for each party in the original
position, we assume that their goodwill stretches over at least two generations.” 57 This
attempt to set up the conditions of deliberation so as to generate obligations of
intergenerational savings has been met with substantial criticism. Bruce Ackerman, for
one, contends that Rawls’ motivational assumption of “intergenerational care” is
inconsistent with the predominant motivational assumptions operating in the original

54

Id.
Id. at 128. Other theorists writing on the subject of intergenerational justice have made similar
assumptions. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future:
Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND . L. REV. 267, 294 (1993) (In
working out an intergenerational savings principle with respect to public goods, “the optimum
social decision requires the current generation as a whole to sacrifice the collective consumption
needed to provide the desired level of public goods in the future. . . . [T]he objective remains to
approximate the level of sacrifice that each family would undertake willingly, in the absence of a
free ride, to provide the benefits of public goods to their descendents alone. The aggregate of
those individual sacrifices would provide the necessary collective sacrifice required of the current
generation.”). Richard Epstein also assumes a genetic predisposition to care for the well-being of
one’s descendents. Richard Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX . L. REV. 1465, 1467
(1989).
56
Rawls, supra note 11, at 292.
57
See also id. at 288 (In deliberating on a just savings principle, “it is assumed that a generation
cares for its immediate descendents, as fathers say care for their sons.”).
55
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position of the absence of intragenerational care. 58 Recall that Rawls posits that the
parties deliberating in the original position are mutually disinterested and are not
concerned to advance anyone else’s well-being but their own, 59 an assumption that
appears inconsistent with the motivational assumption of intergenerational care. In
response to this and other criticisms of his introduction of the motivational assumption of
intergenerational care as a vehicle for generating intergenerational obligations, 60 Rawls
subsequently modified his formulation of the conditions of the original position to
remove its dependence upon this motivational assumption. In his revised formulation of
the conditions in the original position in Political Liberalism, 61 Rawls posits that the
deliberating parties are required “to agree to a savings principle subject to the further
condition that they must want all previous generations to have followed it. Thus the
correct [savings] principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all
generations) would adopt as the one their generation is to follow and as the principle

58

See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 225 (1980). Ackerman
contends that “this altruistic psychology attributed to the contractors considering
intergenerational concerns starkly contrasts with the self-interested psychology of contractors
confronting intragenerational conflicts.” Id. at 224-25.
59
See Rawls, supra note 11, at 139.
60
Other commentators have advanced criticisms of Rawls’ introduction of the motivational
assumption of intergenerational care into the circumstances of the original position. Jane English
contends that if Rawls wishes to structure the deliberation in the original position so as to render
the generation to which one belongs irrelevant, Rawls should abandon his construction that all
parties in the original position are contemporaries and should imagine instead a meeting at which
all generations are represented, with the veil of ignorance concealing from them the (morally
irrelevant) information of which generation they belong to. Jane English, Justice Between
Generations, 31 P HILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 91, 99 (1977). Rawls, however, rejects this
formulation because it is inconsistent with his present time of entry interpretation, as discussed in
text accompanying notes 39-40. Furthermore, English contends that even if we assume that the
deliberating parties are motivated by intergenerational care as described by Rawls – with at least
one person in the present generation caring about the well-being of at least one person in the next
generation – this formulation can only generate short-term, not long-term, savings. English,
supra, at 99.
61
Rawls, supra note 28, at 274.
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they would want preceding generations to have followed (and later generations to
follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in time.”62
Although the details of Rawls’ motivational assumptions operating upon the
parties deliberating regarding intergenerational justice and intergenerational savings
have undergone some revisions, the general outlines of such assumptions are
straightforward. In arriving at a just savings principle,
[T]he ethical problem facing the deliberating parties is that of agreeing on a path over
time which treats all generations justly during the whole course of society’s history. .
. . No generation has stronger claims than any other. In attempting to estimate the
fair rate of savings, the persons in the original position [must consider] what is
reasonable for members of adjacent generations to expect of one another at each level
of advance. They [must attempt to] piece together a just savings schedule by
balancing how much at each stage they would be willing to save for their immediate
descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of their immediate
predecessors . . . [until they] arrive at an estimate that seems fair from both sides. 63
Since no one [in the original position] knows to which generation he belongs, the
question [of how to craft a just savings principle] is viewed from the standpoint of
each [generation] and a fair accommodation is expected by the principle adopted. All
generations are virtually represented in the original position. 64
[In formulating a just savings principle,] the persons in the original position are to ask
themselves how much they would be willing to save at each stage of advance on the
assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rates. That is, they are to
consider their willingness to save at any given phase of civilization with the
understanding that the rates they propose are to regulate the whole span of
accumulation [across the span of historical time]. . . .[T]hey must choose a just
savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to each level of
advance. 65
This process of accumulation, once it is begun and carried through, will then redound
to the benefit of all subsequent generations. 66

62

Id.
Rawls, supra note 11, at 289.
64
Id. at 288.
65
Id. at 287.
66
Id. at 286, 289-90.
63
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In sum, Rawls posits that each generation, regulated by the principle of
intergenerational justice that would be chosen in the original position, is to pass along to
the next generation a certain amount of savings for the benefit of society as a whole.
Such savings can be conceptualized as being made “in return for what is received from
previous generations that enables the later [generations] to enjoy a better life in a more
just society. 67 Accordingly, “savings is achieved by accepting as a political judgment
those policies designed to improve the standard of life of later generations of the least
advantaged, thereby abstaining from the immediate gains that are available.” 68 Acting in
accordance with a just savings principle, “the present generation cannot do as it pleases,
but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define
justice between persons at different moments of time.” 69
Under Rawls’ formulation of just savings for future generations, the subject of
such savings is not limited to financial wealth. Rather, Rawls explicitly extends the just
savings principle to savings in terms of intellectual, educational, and cultural “capital.”70
Regulated by Rawls’ principle of intergenerational savings, members of earlier
generations are not only required to contribute their fair share to the material riches of
society; they must also contribute to the cultural advances that have been made by society
at each stage of advance. 71 In Rawls’ words:
The process of accumulation, once it is begun and carried through, is to the good
of all subsequent generations. Each passes on to the next a fair equivalent in real
capital as defined by the just savings principle. . . . [C]apital is not only factories
67

Id. at 288.
Id. at 292-93.
69
Id. at 293.
70
Id. at 288.
71
The savings required of each generation is to encompass “investment in learning and
education” and obligates each generation to “rais[e] the standard of civilization and culture.” Id.
at 286.
68
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and machines . . . but also the knowledge and culture . . . that make possible just
institutions and the fair value of liberty.” 72
Thus, Rawls claims that the just savings principle requires each generation to pass on to
the next generation the level of culture and learning achieved by society up to that point.
After setting forth the conditions operating upon the contracting parties in
deliberating upon a just savings principle and the subject of such savings, Rawls provides
a broad outline of the savings principle that would be chosen in the original position.
While claiming that it is not possible to define with any precision the rate of just
savings, 73 he contends that the proper just savings principle would obligate each
generation not only to preserve the gains in culture and civilization achieved by previous
generations, but further to augment 74 and contribute their fair share to the wealth of
society, above and beyond the contributions that have been made by previous
generations. 75 Regulated by a principle of intergenerational justice, persons within each

72

Id. at 288.
Id. at 286
74
Id. at 293.
75
Rawls’ claim that the proper intergenerational savings principle requires each generation not
merely to preserve but to augment the gains in culture and civilization has been criticized by
theorists such as Bruce Ackerman. In his treatise Social Justice and the Liberal State, Bruce
Ackerman contends that Rawls has not adequately justified his claim that parties deliberating
behind the veil would choose a savings principle that imposed the obligation on each generation
not merely to preserve but to augment the material and cultural wealth of society. Ackerman
argues that, on Rawls’ own line of reasoning, the deliberating parties would opt not for a steadily
increasing just savings program, but instead for an intergenerational trusteeship :
73

If anything if fundamental to A Theory of Justice, it is the claim that rational contractors
will, when making their fundamental choices, focus exclusively upon their worst possible
outcomes. In the present case, this means the contractors will be unimpressed by the
fact that [Rawls’] “just savings” generates higher welfare to people lucky enough to land
in the later generations. Instead, they will concentrate upon the sacrifices “just savings”
imposes on those who come earlier. . . . One would expect Rawls to predict that the
liberal principle of trusteeship would be the unanimous choice of his original contractors,
for they end up worse off under “just savings” if they find themselves in the first
generation after leaving the original position.
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generation are therefore charged with the duty to maintain and to further just social
institutions and to advance the material and cultural wealth of society for the benefit of
successor generations. 76
Under Rawls’ steadily increasing just savings principle, in terms of cultural
wealth, it would not be enough for earlier generations to simply preserve for future
generations the developments in the arts and sciences that were achieved by previous
generations. Rather, each generation has a duty broadly to advance and take to a higher
level the advancement in the arts and sciences that have been made by its predecessor
generations. Each generation is charged with the duty to improve upon the standard of

The only trouble is that Rawls says just the opposite. He tells us that the contractors
[acting under the motivational assumption of intergenerational care] . . . are concerned
with the welfare of their entire bloodline. . . . [W]hy must a responsible family head want
more for his children than he gets for himself? Why is it not enough to bring the child to
a level of welfare equal to that the parent himself enjoys? It is always possible to shortcircuit these questions simply by stipulating that all contractors have the psychology of
the quintessential Jewish mother, but this stipulation will hardly convince parents of other
temperaments.
Id. at 224-25. Ackerman thus claims that Rawls has not adequately justified the adoption of a just
savings principle in which earlier generations are required to do more than preserve or hold in
trust for future generations the material and cultural wealth of society. Instead, Ackerman
contends that rather than adopting a steadily increasing savings principle, rational risk-averse
contractors would adopt an intergenerational trusteeship. In Ackerman’s version of the
intergenerational trusteeship: “so long as each generation does not deplete the per capita share of
capital available to the next, further accumulation may not be demanded in the name of
trusteeship, nor can less be justified.” Id. at 213, 227. See also Ronald Dworkin, Symposium on
the Public Benefits of the Arts and Humanities, 9 COLUM . J. OF ART & THE LAW 123, 156-57
(“We inherit a cultural structure, and we have some duty, out of simple justice, to leave that
structure at least as rich as we found it.”)
Although an important theoretical debate, the issue dividing Rawls and Ackerman –
whether intergenerational justice requires mere trusteeship or net accumulation of society’s
cultural and material capital – is not pivotal for the transition from a publicly ordered realm of
creators’ rights to a privately ordered realm. Rather, the more pressing issue is whether presentday creators – who have benefited from a system of limited rights and savings with respect to
creative works -- can now establish a system in which savings for the benefit of future creators is
no longer required at all. That is, the question becomes whether present-day creators can now
assert unlimited rights in their creative works and essentially abandon even the limited
Ackermanian duty to serve as trustees for society’s cultural advances achieved up to this point.
76
Rawls, supra note 11, at 290.

22

life of later generations by furthering the level of advance of cultural and material wealth
that had been achieved by previous generations. 77
In sum, Rawls advances a theory of justice between generations and a just savings
principle in which the generation into which one is born is and should be rendered
morally irrelevant. According to such a theory, the distribution of benefits and burdens
made available by cooperation in society is determined without reference to an
individual’s temporal priority along the timeline of society. In particular, individuals
deliberating in the original position are required to choose a principle of intergenerational
savings that they would want all previous generations to have followed (and later
generations to follow), no matter how far backward or forward in time. Members of each
generation must attempt to craft a just savings principle by balancing how much they
would be willing to save for future generations against what they would feel entitled to
77

Rawls claims that, at some point, further increases in the wealth of society will be
counterproductive and will not serve to improve later generations’ standard of life. The
generations “are not bound to go on maximizing indefinitely;” id. at 289; excessive and everincreasing accumulation of material wealth can constitute a “positive hindrance” to society. Id. at
290. Thus, at a certain stage of development of society, subsequent generations are no longer
required to further the wealth of society, but are only charged with the obligation of maintaining
such wealth. See also id. at 298 (“The just savings principle acts as a constraint on the rate of
accumulation. Each age is to do its fair share in achieving the conditions necessary for just
institutions and the fair value of liberty; but beyond this more cannot be required.”). It is unclear
whether this same cap imposed by Rawls’ on his steadily increasing savings principle applies,
mutatis mutandis, with respect to the cultural wealth of society. Can it be said that at some point,
advances in culture and knowledge would constitute a “hindrance” to society, and that therefore
the proper interpretation of the savings principle for such later generations would only require
them to preserve, but not to advance, the cultural wealth of society? Because advances in culture
and learning arguably continue to improve the quality of life of a society and do not have the
same capacity for distraction as does excessive accumulation of material wealth, the reasoning
supporting Rawls’ imposition of a cap on the steadily increasing just rate of savings in the realm
of material and financial wealth does not necessarily carry over to the realm of cultural
advancement. See id. at 287 (“Once just institutions are firmly established, the net accumulation
required falls to zero. At this point, a society meets its duty of justice by maintaining just
institutions and preserving their material base.”) (emphasis added). Thus, although the duty
imposed upon each generation to further the material wealth of society at some point of advance
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claim of prior generations, until they reach a principle that seems fair and reasonable
from both sides to govern the span of savings across historical time. Regulated by a
principle of intergenerational savings, individuals within each generation are obliged to
forgo immediate gains that are available to them where necessary to preserve (and
augment) for future generations a certain standard of life, measured not only in financial
terms, but also in terms of society’s cultural and intellectual advancement.

II. INTERGENERATIONAL J USTICE AND AUTHORS ’ RIGHTS
The principle of justice between generations and accompanying just savings
principle articulated in Part I have important implications for the design of systems of
private property in general and for the design of intellectual property rights in particular.
In this Part, I contend that systems of rights in creative works should be designed,
consistent with intergenerational justice obligations, to embody a commitment on the part
of earlier “generations” of authors to preserve certain elements and uses of their creative
works for the benefit of future generations -- even where doing so requires the present
generation of creators to “abstain[] from the immediate gains that are available”78 to
them. In developing this argument, I first structure a Rawlsian initial choice situation in
which authors deliberate regarding the scope of rights in creative works. In order to
generate a just savings principle that is consistent with obligations of intergenerational
justice, I set up the initial choice situation such that the generation to which each
deliberating party belongs is obscured from him or her. Parties deliberating in this initial
choice situation are then charged with the task of choosing a just savings principle that
converts to the duty to merely maintain such wealth, it is not clear whether the same can be said
with respect to the cultural wealth of society.
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treats all generations of creators justly over the span of historical time.

A. Obligations of Intergenerational Justice and Systems of Rights in
Creative Works
1. Constructing the Initial Choice Situation
In modeling an initial choice situation to generate principles governing the
protection of creative works consistent with the obligations of intergenerational justice, it
must first be determined what range of interests will be taken into account by the
deliberating parties. The initial choice situation could be structured to take into account a
wide range of interests across the entire spectrum from creators to non-creators. The
non-creator end of the spectrum would encompass the interests of those who stand to
benefit from access to creative works, either by the mere edification that comes from
such access, or by their eventual incorporation of such works into their own creations.
The problem of designing a system of protections that balances the need to incentivize
creation through strong property rights against the need to encourage access by limiting
such property rights is a familiar one that centers primarily around intragenerational
justice concerns, which focuses on the distribution of benefits among individuals
belonging roughly to the same generation. In working out an initial choice situation in
which individuals deliberate on the scope of rights in creative works, I will instead focus

78

Rawls, supra note 11, at 292-93.
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on the related but intergenerational inquiry of the duties and obligations imposed on
earlier generations of authors to successor generations of authors. 79
In this section, I consider the conflicting interests and incentives operating upon
successive generations of creators, so as to explore the development of a principle of
justice between authors over time. Consistent with analyzing the obligations of
intergenerational justice for systems of rights in creative works, the authors deliberating
in this initial situation would not know to which authorial generation they belonged,
whether they were born into an earlier and less culturally advanced society, or to a later,
culturally advanced stage of society. That is to say, each author deliberating on the
scope of rights in creative works would not know whether, upon leaving the original
position, she would be creating within the cultural context of the Nineteenth or the
Twenty-First Century, for example. She would not know who had written before her,
what ideas had previously been embodied in works of authorship, or to what extent the
process of creating her works of authorship would be dependent upon incorporating
elements of works that came before her.
The authors deliberating in the original position would be charged with
developing a system of rights in creative works that would be fair and reasonable to
authors regardless of which creative generation across the span of historical time they
turned out to belong to. The savings principle that would be chosen in this initial
situation with respect to creative works would be the one that members of any authorial
generation (and so all authorial generations) would adopt as the one their generation is to
79

This project is more relevant to the task of justifying to present-day authors limitations on their
rights. That is to say, if the interests represented in the initial choice situation encompass only the
interests of authors, and if nonetheless the principle emerging out of the deliberations imposes
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follow and as the principle they would want all previous generations to have followed
and future generations to follow, no matter how far backward or forward in time. In
selecting this savings principle, the deliberating parties would consider what is fair and
reasonable for adjacent generations of creators to expect from one another, and would
select a just savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of savings to each level of
advance over time. Deliberating authors would consider, for example, what sort of
savings it would be reasonable for them to expect on the part of authors who precede
them whose works they will likely build upon in creating their own works.
Concomitantly, deliberating authors would evaluate such a savings principle in light of
the sacrifices it would impose upon them (in terms of forgone profits) by requiring them
to save for the benefit of the immediately succeeding authorial generation.
2. The Savings of Works of Intellectual Property
Throughout my analysis, I have implicitly assumed that some measure of
“savings” on the part of predecessor authors is required to protect the interests of future
authors, and have therefore suggested that authors deliberating in an initial choice
situation regarding the scope of property rights in creative works would opt for some
form of “savings” with respect to such works. But this first claim, and the assumptions it
embodies about the nature of the creative process, calls for closer scrutiny. What
precisely is meant by the savings of creative works for the benefit of future creators? If I
write a novel or a song or a software program, in what sense must such works, or
elements of such works, be preserved for the benefit of future generations of creators?
The subject of our inquiry is works of intellectual property, which, unlike tangible
limitations on authors’ rights, then the justification for such limitations would be more appealing
to present-day authors.
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property, can be enjoyed and consumed by many without diminishment, so what sense
does it make to speak of the need for savings with respect to such works? It is one thing
to require non-renewable natural resources like oil and gas, or intangible resources like
financial capital, to be saved for the benefit of future generations. But for works of
intellectual property, like novels and songs and software, which can be consumed by
many without diminishment, why must certain elements or uses of them be preserved for
the benefit of future generations?
The answer inheres in the recognition that even though works of intellectual
property are non-rivalrous as regards their consumption, they are nonetheless excludable.
That is to say, by virtue of one’s positive intellectual property rights, an author can
exclude others from making use of or incorporating elements of her work absent
authorization. If authors can exclude others from making use of their works without their
permission, such a right to exclude, if construed too broadly, will impinge upon the
ability of future authors to create – at least if and to the extent that the nature of the
creative process entails building upon elements of pre-existing works. Put simply, if I
write the first blues song, and the state grants me a property right in that song, then
depending upon the extent of that property right, I may be able to prohibit others from
singing their own blues. If I write the first opera or play about starving artists struggling
to make ends meet, then depending upon the extent of that property right, I may be able
to prohibit others from writing their own version of the same. 80 If I write the first
database spreadsheet program, then depending upon the extent of my property rights in

80

To use a well-known example, if the copyright owner of the opera La Boheme exercised
exclusive rights regarding the portrayal of the opera’s underlying ideas, then the owner could
prevent the musical Rent from being made.
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that program, I may be able to prohibit others from writing an improved and competing
spreadsheet program. 81
Yet, the scope of property rights in creative works is only problematic from the
standpoint of intergenerational justice between authors if the creative process is
conceptualized as one that necessarily entails the incorporation of elements of preexisting creative works. If and to the extent that the creative process is conceptualized as
one that necessarily entails building upon elements of pre-existing creative works – or
what I will call the “recombinative conception” of the creative process – then some
measure of savings of creative works is necessary for the creative process to flourish in
the long run. If and to the extent that the creative process is conceptualized as one that
involves truly and utterly original creation – or what I will call the “ex nihilo” conception
of the creative process82 – then savings of creative works would not be necessary for the
creative process to flourish in the long run. Because the adoption of one over the other
competing conception of the creative process is a highly relevant input to the parties’
deliberations in the initial choice situation regarding the selection of a just savings
principle for creative works, it will be worthwhile to explore these contrasting
conceptions of the creative process in greater detail.
3. Conceptions of the Creative Process
Within the “ex nihilo” conception of the creative process, creators are
conceptualized as creating their works out of thin air or out of nothing, 83 and creators
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See, e.g., Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided S.Ct., 513
U.S. 233 (1996).
82
See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 156 (1996).
83
See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 109, 110
(1991) (copyright is about “sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an individual to
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therefore have no inherent need to rely upon or make use of elements of pre-existing
creative works. 84 In the words of philosopher James Child, an exponent of the ex nihilo
conception, the process of creating intellectual property is one in which ideas are
“thought of and, thus, created (or discovered) and appropriated ex nihilo, merely by hard
(and creative) thought. . . . [The underlying components of intellectual property are]
created out of nothing but mental labor. [The creator doesn’t] even need raw materials . .
. .”85 Child contends further that because the stuff of intellectual property (unlike the
stuff of real property) is inexhaustible and because the process of creation is one in which
creators create ex nihilo, limitations imposed on intellectual property in order to preserve
the raw materials of the creative process for other creators are unwarranted. Taking ideas
as one example of the underlying components of intellectual property, Child contends
that
. . . [I]deas are not like real property . . . , just because (as we have seen)
there is a source of an infinite (or indefinitely large) number of new ideas that can
be thought of and, thus, created (or discovered) and appropriated ex nihilo, merely
by hard (and creative) thought. . . . [When I privatize an idea], the number
available to you is not thereby decreased. . . . [Y]ou are not deprived, so long as
you remain able and willing to exert mental labor. . . . As it is with patents, so it is
with copyrights. . . All of these kinds of property share the characteristic that,
while I can exclude you from the use of mine, there is not thereby a smaller
amount upon which you can draw to use or own.86

craft out of thin air an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen Kane.”), quoted in Boyle,
supra note 82, at 156.
84
See Boyle, supra note 82, at 56-57 (comparing conception of novelist who “crafts out of thin
air,” who “does not need a rich and fertile public domain on which to draw,” and conception of
artistry in which development is based on existing material, in which “poetry can be only be
made out of other poems, novels out of other novels.”)
85
See James W. Child, The Moral Foundations of Intangible Property , 73 THE MONIST 578
(1990), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY, MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS 68-69 (Adam D. Moore, ed. 1997). Furthermore, Child argues that (to the extent
that creation requires something more than nothing) the components of the creative process are

30

According to the ex nihilo conception of the creative process, creators create not so much
by building upon pre-existing elements of others’ works or by making transformative
uses of pre-existing works, but by exerting mental labor to create ex nihilo. On this
conception of the creative process, even though intellectual property is excludable,
unlimited rights in intellectual property present no difficulties from the perspective of
intergenerational justice because broad intellectual property rights for earlier authors do
not impinge upon the rights of subsequent authors – who can create by exerting hard and
creative thought and who can generate the relevant raw materials of the creative process
ex nihilo. If and to the extent that the parties deliberating in the initial choice situation
were to take as their starting place an ex nihilo conception of the creative process, in
which the act of creation does not necessarily involve the incorporation of elements of
pre-existing works, then limitations on authors’ rights in creative works would not
necessarily be warranted on intergenerational justice grounds.
In contrast, under the recombinative conception, the creative process is
conceptualized as one in which creators create through a process by which they are
inspired by, build upon, and recast elements of preexisting works of authorship, and make
transformative and productive uses of such pre-existing works. As Jessica Litman, an
exponent of the recombinative conception of the creative process, puts it:
[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.
Composers recombine sounds they have heard before, playwrights base their
characters on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other
playwrights’ characters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots
within their experience; software writers use the logic they find in other software;
. . . cinematographers, actors, choreographers, architects, and sculptors all engage
practically infinite in number, such that my exclusive ownership of a component of the creative
process would not in any way impair your ability to create. Id.
86
See Child, supra note 85, at 68-69.
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in the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is already ‘out
there’ in some other form. . . This . . . is the essence of authorship. 87
Wendy Gordon, also an exponent of the recombinative conception of the creative
process, contends that recombination is the essence of the technological as well as the
artistic process of creation and intellectual advancement:
New creators inevitably and usefully build on predecessors. In her invention of
techniques, discoveries, ideas, or themes, the new creator speaks out of a history,
and the very value of her contribution will depend upon her advancing upon what
has come before. The inventor of the automobile builds on one predecessor’s
invention of metal-smelting processes, another predecessor’s invention of gears,
another predecessor’s invention of the wheel, and ultimately on the efforts of
some Promethean cave-dweller who, in discovering how to make fire, laid the
groundwork for the internal combustion engine. The pattern is not limited to
technological culture. Artists learn from predecessors the laws of perspective, the
uses of oils, acrylics, and watercolors, and the very traditions that give meaning to
their productions. As for music, it is often argued that there is a limited
vocabulary available for musical composition, and that composers will inevitably
and necessarily work in a received tradition, as well as re-use prior themes.
Communication depends on a common language and common experience. 88
Adoption of the recombinative conception of the creative process in turn requires
that certain components of pre-existing creative works be preserved unowned for the
benefit of future prospective authors so that they can build upon such components in
creating their own works. In the oft-quoted words of Zechariah Chafee:
The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors.
A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
87

Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 965-66 (1990). See also Wendy
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556 (1993).
88
Gordon, supra note 87, at 1556. Further examples of theorists who argue in favor of or who
presume a recombinative conception of the creative process are manifold. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
P OSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 403 (1988) (“The literary imagination . . . is not a volcano of
pure inspiration but a weaving of the author’s experience of life into an existing literary
tradition.”). See also Dworkin, supra note 75, at 156 (“We must have a tradition of innovation
and we must have particular forms of art sufficiently open-ended and amenable to interpretation
so that continuity can be preserved through innovation . . . .” ).
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himself. Progress would be stifled if the author had a complete monopoly on
everything [in his work for the entire copyright term or for an unlimited term].
Some use of its contents must be permitted in connection with the independent
creation of other authors. The very policy which leads the law to encourage his
creativeness also justifies facilitating the creativeness of others. 89
In short, the adoption of one conception of the creative process over the other has
significant implications for structuring a system of rights and privileges in creative
works. If and to the extent that the parties deliberating in the initial choice situation were
to adopt an ex nihilo conception of the creative process and conceptualize the creative
process as one in which authors create out of nothing, then it matters not from the
standpoint of intergenerational justice whether any limitations are imposed upon authors’
rights in their works of authorship or whether any savings of components or uses of such
works is required. If and to the extent that the deliberating parties were to adopt a
recombinative conception of the creative process, then the creative process is
conceptualized as one in which authors necessarily create by building upon components
of pre-existing creative works, and certain elements and uses of creative works must be
preserved for the benefit of future authors through the imposition of limitations on
authors’ rights.
The issue of which conception more closely reflects the actual process of creation
is a complex and to some extent a circular one. It is certainly true that much of Western
art, literature, and science has benefited greatly from a culture in which borrowing and
“standing upon the shoulders” of one’s predecessors has been permitted and
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Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM . L. R EV. 503, 533
(1945). See also BENJAMIN KAPLAN , AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967) (“Progress,
if it is not entirely an illusion, depends upon a generous indulgence of copying”).

33

encouraged. 90 Many at the forefront of the technological revolution contend that their
successes have resulted from building upon the works of their predecessors. 91 Yet we
could certainly conceive of creative cultures in which borrowing from others’ works is
discouraged or outright prohibited, or in which creation was conceptualized as occurring
– and therefore encouraged to occur – ex nihilo.
Adopting a Rawlsian construction of the initial choice situation, we can assume
that the deliberating parties are at least to some extent risk averse and would therefore
choose to minimize their worst possible outcomes upon leaving the original position. 92
Accordingly, the deliberating parties would consider and weigh the possible outcomes of
the decision to save versus the decision not to save under circumstances in which they
turned out to be recombinative creators compared to circumstances in which they turned
out to be ex nihilo creators. In particular, they would evaluate two competing outcomes:
(1) the worst case outcome if, upon leaving the original position, they turned out to be ex
nihilo creators; and (2) the worst case outcome if, upon leaving the original position, they
turned out to be recombinative creators who therefore needed to build upon the preexisting works of earlier creators. Uncertain about whether, upon exiting the initial
choice situation, they would become ex nihilo creators or recombinative creators, and
facing the decision of whether to save elements and uses of their creative works for the
benefit of subsequent creators, the parties would adopt the alternative the worst outcome
90

To take an especially well-known example, Shakespeare is considered to be among the greatest
literary borrowers of all times, and not coincidentally, also among the most creative. See Posner,
supra note 88, at 403, 396. My aim is not to answer the question of which conception of the
creative process most accurately reflects the creative process, but rather to elucidate the
differences between the two conceptions and to explore the implications of the adoption of one
conception over the other for a system of rights and limitations in creative works.
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See Boyle, supra note 82, at 165 (describing opposition of several prominent computer experts
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of which is superior to the worst outcome of the others (which Rawls denominates the
“maximin” principle). 93 Consistent with the maximin principle, the deliberating parties
would select some type of savings principle, because the worst possible outcome of the
decision to adopt a savings principle with respect to creative works is superior to the
worst possible outcome of the decision not to save – in which creation is impossible or
severely impaired if upon leaving the original position an author turns out to need to
make use of pre-existing creative works in creating her own works.
Having decided to minimize their worst possible outcomes upon leaving the
initial choice situation and to thereby adopt a savings principle of some sort, the
deliberating parties would then need to determine how broad or narrow a savings
principle to adopt with respect to creative works. In doing so, they would need to agree
on a path over time that treats all generations of creators justly during the course of
society’s creative history. 94 In particular, they would be charged with choosing a
principle of savings that they would want all previous authorial generations to have
followed, and would want all future authorial generations to follow, no matter how far
backward or forward in time. 95 Given these constraints on their decision-making, the
deliberating parties would not credit an argument for extensive and unlimited creative
rights representing solely the interests of authors who had already created their work and
who sought to maximize their share of wealth accruing from such creations, because the
deliberating parties would be required to agree on a savings principle in cultural materials
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Id. at 152-53.
94
Id. at 291.
95
See Rawls, supra note 28, at 274.
93

35

that they would want all previous generations to have followed. 96 If previous generations
of authors had secured maximal rights for their works, then pursuant to the recombinative
conception of the creative process, present-day authors would have been unable to create
their own works. Thus, the deliberating parties, taking into account the interests of all
creative generations, would agree to limits on the rights of all authors in order to preserve
the raw materials of the creative process for all authors, regardless of when they arrived
on the timeline of society.

4. Translating Mandated Savings into Specific Limitations on Authors’
Rights
Having concluded that authors behind the veil of ignorance would opt for some
system of mandated savings in creative works, I next take up the consideration of how
such “savings” of creative works would translate into limitations to be imposed on
authors’ rights. In this section, I contend that parties deliberating in an initial choice
situation who were concerned to protect the interests of all generations of creators would
include: (1) limitations on the scope of rights in creative works, such that the fundamental
raw materials for subsequent authors’ process of creation would remain available to
them; (2) limitations on authors’ right to control transformative uses of their works; (3)
limitations on authors’ right to control critical assessments of their works; and, possibly
(4) durational limitations on authors’ rights in their works. My analysis of the interests
and incentives operating upon authors in a Rawlsian initial choice situation supports
limitations on authors’ rights that partially overlap with the limitations imposed on
96
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copyright rights, as discussed in Part III. Yet, my analysis diverges from copyright law’s
justifications for limiting rights in several ways. First, my analysis is rights-based –
focusing on the right of authors across historical time to create -- whereas copyright law’s
is predominantly utilitarian. Second, unlike mainstream copyright theory, my analysis
does not take into account the role of transactions costs in justifying limitations on
authors’ rights. 97 Because my analysis aims to justify limitations on creators’ rights in the
digital age -- where transactions costs are supposedly diminishing98 -- I focus on
justifications other than transactions costs for limiting authors’ rights. 99
a. Limitations on the Scope of Rights in Creative Works
Not knowing which creative generation along the timeline of society they would
turn out to belong to upon leaving the original position, authors deliberating in the
original position would choose to preserve for later generations of authors access to the
raw materials and fundamentally reusable elements of the creative process. Thus, for
example, deliberating authors would seek to preserve for subsequent authorial
generations reusable creative elements like ideas and ideational elements – including
stock characters, situations, plot lines, etc. 100 -- that could be reformulated and
97

See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM . L. REV. 1600 (1982)
(contending that the fair use doctrine in copyright law can be explained as a response to market
breakdown between earlier authors/would-be licensors and subsequent authors/would-be
licensees).
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See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
“Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 2 BERK. TECH. L.J. 115 (1997); Richard Alan
Horning, Has Hal Signed A Contract: The Statute of Frauds in Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 253, 256 (1996).
99
Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
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types of limitations on their rights because of the high transactions costs associated with
consensual bargains in certain circumstances).
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Although, for simplicity, I rely primarily on literary examples, the importance of preserving
ideas embodied in creative works applies as well to technological works of authorship, such as
software programs, which contain such ideational elements as algorithms and basic procedures
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reincorporated into creative works by subsequent authors. Even if it could truly be said
that such ideas and ideational elements were initially created by any one author, the
deliberating parties, applying a principle of intergenerational justice, would opt to save
such components for the benefit of future authors by excluding them from the scope of
creators’ rights in their works. As Richard Posner contends with respect to the ideational
elements embodied in literary works:
[I]n order to pass the test of time . . . a [literary] work must be relatively
impervious to cultural change. It must therefore deal . . . with the recurrent
problems of the human condition – with the commonplaces of life, with stock
situations, stock characters, stock narratives. . . [As] ideas in literature .. .
comprise a quite limited stock of situations, narratives, and character types, to
recognize property rights in them would . . . deplete the stock of literary raw
material available for later writers without fee.101
Of course, forging the line between non-privatizable ideational elements and other,
privatizable elements of creative works will be an intricate task. In drawing the relevant
lines, parties should generally be guided by the recombinative conception of the creative
process, and should ensure that rights in creative works are designed such that later
authors have access to certain fundamental components of the creative process.
b. Limitations Facilitating Subsequent Transformative Uses of Creative
Works
In translating a just savings principle into limitations on authors’ rights in their
creative works, authors deliberating in an initial choice situation would also opt to
preserve for later authors the right to make transformative uses of prior creative works.
Subsequent authors would be granted the right to incorporate limited portions of all
elements (not just the ideational elements) of prior works if and to the extent that these
which other software developers arguably need to recombine and recast in creating their own
works. See, e.g., Whelan v. Jaslow, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Computer Associates v. Altai,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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subsequent works built upon and transformed such elements of the earlier works. It
would be insufficient, for example, to grant creators of biographies, histories, and
journalistic works the right to merely reformulate the ideas contained within pre-existing
works. 102 Such creators of essentially referential works would likely need to be able to
incorporate direct quotations from prior works in order to create their own works. 103 In
accurately painting the history of a particular period, the historian may need to quote or
copy directly from prior creative works in creating her own transformative work. Thus, it
would not suffice to design a savings principle that merely entitled authors to incorporate
ideational elements form pre-existing works. In order to ensure that later authors of
referential works are able to exercise their right to create, authors deliberating in the
initial choice situation would opt to impose limitations on authors’ rights to exercise
exclusive control over subsequent transformative uses of their own works. 104
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Posner, supra note 88, at 393-94 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111-16
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This category of transformative, productive uses may also extend to uses of pre-existing works
for purposes such as research or education, the transformative or productive character of which is
more indirect or diffuse than in the above examples. Thus, even if, for example, a teacher’s
copying of a portion of a creative work appears at first blush to be merely reproductive, not
productive, and even if her students do not then immediately make a transformative use of the
copied work, nevertheless such educational use may be transformative in the long run, by serving
as an input to the creative endeavors of students at some point in the future. Whether such
indirectly transformative educational and research uses would be permitted as fair and free uses
may depend on the level of wealth achieved at any particular stage of society. See Rawls, supra
note 11, at 290. In a sufficiently wealthy society, subsidies for educational fair use, for example,
at the expense of authors, may no longer be warranted, whereas in a less well off society, such
subsidies might be warranted. Cf. Merges, supra note 98, at 134-35 (arguing that in the
cyberspace realm, copyright law’s fair use doctrine should be justified on the explicitly
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c. Limitations Facilitating Subsequent Evaluations of Creative Works
Thirdly, authors deliberating in the initial choice situation would opt to limit all
authors’ rights so as to permit evaluative uses to be made of authors’ works, even where
such evaluative uses have the effect of harming the market for a particular author’s work.
Although this category of uses might be subsumed within the above category of
transformative uses (for example, in the case of parodies), it is worth considering such
uses separately because of the unique barriers such uses impose to consensual bargaining
between earlier authors and subsequent authors. While it is conceivable that earlier
authors would consent to or license for a fee certain transformative uses of their works, it
is unlikely that they would voluntarily permit critical, evaluative uses to be made of their
works. In choosing between a rule that prohibited evaluative, critical uses and a rule that
privileged such uses, the deliberating parties would consider the benefits that evaluative
uses provide to authors as a class, including by enabling them to rely upon such unbiased
evaluations in determining which works to build upon in creating their own works.
Recognizing that such evaluative uses tend to benefit authors as a class because they
encourage consumer confidence in works of authorship, the deliberating parties would
permit such uses and would limit all authors’ rights accordingly.
d. Durational Limits on Rights in Creative Works
It will often be difficult to draw the line between those elements and uses of
works that should fall within an author’s exclusive rights pursuant to the above
intergenerational justice analysis, and those that should fall outside the scope of an
author’s exclusive rights. To account for the possibility that such lines may be drawn
redistributive grounds of granting subsidies to particular classes of creators, instead of on the
conventional grounds of overcoming barriers to the formation of markets).
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imperfectly and in a manner insufficiently protective of future authors’ creative rights,
deliberating parties may opt to impose bright line durational limits on authors’ rights in
their works as a type of fail-safe measure. Such durational limitations would ensure that,
at some point, all elements and subsequent uses of creative works would be freely
available for use by subsequent authors. If, for example, the plot lines of star-crossed
lovers or desperate starving artists were somehow (erroneously) determined to fall within
an authors’ exclusive rights so that the first author embodying such plot lines could
exercise exclusive rights with respect to them, then the imposition of the fail-safe of
durational limitations on such rights would ensure that future authors at some point
would be permitted to incorporate such ideational elements into their own works.
Yet even if it were known that the relevant lines demarcating authors’ exclusive
rights could be drawn perfectly in every case, the deliberating parties might still opt to
impose durational limits on creative rights, on the grounds that certain prior works may in
their entirety become so integral to the creative vocabulary that subsequent creators
should be permitted to make free use of them in their entirety in creating their own
works. The authors deliberating in the initial choice situation might opt to protect
subsequent authors’ right to make extensive use of prior creative works that have become
so deeply embedded within our cultural framework as to become essential to other
authors’ ability to create. Deliberating parties might therefore choose to structure the
system of authors’ rights and limitations in such a way as to allow authors after a period
of time to freely and fully incorporate and build upon works like Homer’s Odyssey, 105
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Twentieth Century Irish author James Joyce built extensively upon Homer’s Odyssey in
creating Ulysses, one of the greatest works of the past century.
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Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, 106 Mozart’s Marriage of Figaro, 107 or Virginia Woolf’s
Mrs. Dalloway, 108 in creating their own transformative works.
In short, authors deliberating behind a veil of ignorance that obscured from them
information as to which creative generation along the timeline of society they belonged
would opt for limitations on authors’ rights that would preserve for subsequent authors
the ability to fully exercise their creative rights, including the ability to incorporate
ideational elements from prior works, to make transformative and evaluative uses of prior
works, and possibly, to make full and free use of all prior works after a certain period of
time.
B. An Economic Analysis of Just Savings of Creative Works
The economic analysis of copyright law set forth by William Landes and Richard
Posner, 109 while emanating out of a utilitarian tradition quite different from the Rawlsian
rights-based framework pursued above, 110 provides some helpful guidance in analyzing
the contours of the savings principle that would be chosen by authors behind the veil of
ignorance. Consistent with Rawls’ principal goal in A Theory of Justice of advancing
justice as fairness as an alternative to utilitarian theories of distributive justice, Rawls
contends that the parties deliberating in the original position would reject a utilitarian
principle for guiding their decisions regarding the distribution of the benefits and burdens
106
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of societal cooperation and would adopt his two principles of justice instead. 111 In this
section, however, I consider what flows from an initial choice situation where the parties
were guided by a principle of utility in their deliberations regarding the nature and scope
of rights in creative works.
In their economic analysis of copyright law, Landes and Posner explore the
tensions between (1) the interests of earlier “generations” of authors – i.e., those who
have already created their works -- in expanding their rights, and (2) the interests of
future generations of authors – i.e., those who have not yet created their works – in
limiting the rights of the authors who come before them. Landes and Posner consider the
conflicting motivations and preferences at work among different generations of authors
regarding the scope of rights in creative works. Assuming that the process of creation is
essentially recombinative in nature, 112 Landes and Posner claim that where rights in
creative works are limited, subsequent authors can more cheaply and easily borrow from
pre-existing works. The cost of creation for later authors is accordingly lower under a
regime in which authors' rights in their creative works are limited. 113 On the other hand,
in a regime of unlimited, extensive property rights in creative works, in which all copying
of such works is prohibited, the cost of creating new works is higher and the number of
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future works created will likely be lower. 114 As Posner contends in his treatise Law and
Literature,
The more extensive copyright protection is, the more inhibited is the literary
imagination. . . The works of previous writers are inputs into current work, and
these inputs get more expensive the more those earlier works are protected by
copyright. If every author of an epic poem had to pay royalties to Homer’s heirs,
then Virgil, Dante, Ariosto, Milton, Pope, Goethe, and others would have had to
incur an additional expense to write their epics [and therefore may not have
created such works]. 115
In their economic analysis of copyright law, Landes and Posner suggest that, in designing
a system of rights and limitations on rights in creative works, authors as a class would
approach the question of the scope of rights in creative works from the ex ante position
by taking into account two different perspectives: (1) the perspective of the present (or
the "earlier") generation of authors, who have the incentive to limit the extent to which
creative works can be mined as source material for other works; and (2) the perspective
of subsequent authors, who wish to borrow from pre-existing works in order to create
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Id. at 403, 396. Posner’s analysis is echoed by Wendy Gordon, who argues similarly that the
enforcement of limitations on the creative rights of (earlier) authors is necessary to ensure that
later authors will have the full and fair opportunity to create:
One cannot assume that early creators or their heirs would consent to the use of property
by others to create new intellectual products if the first creators had control of these
necessary prior resources. [While some owners might consent to uncompensated or
reasonably compensated use,] others might refuse to sell altogether or charge more than
the new creators can afford. More significantly, the cost of tracing ownership and
effecting transactions could itself be prohibitive. . . . Thus, if perpetual property existed in
all intangibles, many creators would have to choose between using someone else’s
property without permission, or forgoing creation of their own. . . . For new creators to
flourish, they must be able to draw on an array or prior creations that are not privately
owned.
Gordon, supra note 87, at 1557.
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their own works and who therefore prefer limited rights in creative works. 116
Approaching the issue of the scope of rights in creative works solely from the first type of
author's perspective, deliberating parties would opt for extensive property rights in
creative works, while introducing the subsequent author's perspective into the analysis
would counsel in favor of limited property rights in creative works. As Landes and
Posner explain:
Copyright holders might therefore find it in their self-interest, ex ante, to
limit copyright protection. To the extent that a later author is free to
borrow material from an earlier one, the later’s cost of expression is
reduced; and, from an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an earlier
author from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the
later author himself. In the former role, he desires maximum copyright
protection for the works he creates; in the latter, he prefers minimum
protection for works created earlier by others. In principle, there is a level
of copyright protection that balances these two competing interests . . . . 117
As Landes and Posner suggest, the imposition of limitations on rights in creative
works serves the goal of advancing the creative process in both the short run and
the long run, 118 by requiring present-day authors to forgo the profits they would
earn if they enjoyed unlimited rights in their works, in the interest of subsequent
authors.
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Landes and Posner’s ex ante analysis of authors’ interests and incentives
undertaken from an economic perspective justifies imposing limitations on
authors’ rights, several of which coincide with the limitations justified by the
above Rawlsian analysis. First, the economic analysis provides a rationale for
declining to extend property rights to the ideas underlying works of authorship:
Suppose our N authors did not know which would be the first to come up
with an idea that the other N – 1 authors would use. . . . Since . . . the
costs involved in coming up with the kind of new idea normally embodied
in an expressive work usually are low relative to the costs in time and
effort of expressing the idea, . . . the N authors . . . probably would agree
unanimously (or nearly so) to a rule that protected expression but not
ideas. 119
Relying on a version of the hypothetical tripartite contract between predecessor
authors, the present generation of authors, and successor authors, Landes and
Posner’s economic analysis provides a justification for limiting the scope of
property rights in works of authorship to exclude ideas and similar ideational
elements.
Similarly, Landes and Posner suggest that, ex ante, authors would agree to
limitations on their rights that were necessary to ensure that subsequent authors
could make transformative uses of elements of earlier works as the inputs to the
subsequent authors’ works. In particular, they argue, subsequent authors may
need to make use of inputs from earlier works that are not properly considered
ideas, but yet are part of the raw materials from which such authors would need to
be able to draw. Because such transformative uses would lower the cost of
expression for all authors and would therefore tend to increase the number of
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works created, such limitations would be justified under Landes and Posner’s
economic analysis. 120
Landes and Posner further suggest that ex ante, authors would agree to
limitations on their rights where necessary to allow subsequent authors to make
critical uses of earlier works, for purposes such as book reviews and parodies. 121
They contend that authors ex ante would choose to impose limitations on their
exclusive rights necessary to allow for production of credible and unbiased
reviews of their works, because such reviews facilitate a reliable market in
creative works, which in turn redounds to the benefit of authors as a class. 122
Finally, Landes and Posner contend that ex ante, authors would agree to a limited
term for authors’ rights in their works. In balancing the increased income
attributable to longer terms of protection against the increased cost of expression
for authors because of the diminished public domain, authors ex ante would opt
for a limited term of rights in their works. 123
In sum, although Landes and Posner’s economic analysis of copyright
rights grows out of a utilitarian tradition which contrasts with the rights-based
Rawlsian analysis of authors’ rights set forth above, both analyses support
limiting authors’ rights in several significant respects.
C. Possible Objections to Requiring Intergenerational Savings of
Creative Works
In Parts I and II, I have argued that, deliberating behind a veil of ignorance,
where authors did not know which creative generation they would be born into, authors
120
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would agree to certain limitations on their rights, which we can construe as requiring
savings of portions of their works for the benefit of all generations of authors. In this
section, I anticipate and address some objections to my analysis of the just savings
required of authors. In particular, Richard Epstein, writing on the subject of
intergenerational justice, intergenerational savings, and property rights, 124 contends that
any requirement of savings imposed on the present generation for the benefit of future
generations is unnecessary and inefficient. While Landes and Posner’s economic
analysis justifies the imposition of limitations on creators’ rights similar to those justified
on an intergenerational justice analysis, Richard Epstein’s economic analysis suggests
that no limitations on the present generation’s rights are justified in order to protect the
interests of subsequent generations. Epstein apparently would reject any system of
mandated intergenerational savings applied to property rights generally, 125 and would
rely solely on the market, and our genetic predisposition to save for our immediate
descendents, to ensure sufficient savings for future generations.
In his article Justice Across the Generations, 126 Epstein first contends that the preeminent contributors to the subject of justice between generations “focu[s] too much on
duty and too little on practice and incentive.” 127 Rejecting the Rawlsian approach of
looking to the state to enforce the obligations owed by earlier generations to subsequent
ones, Epstein contends that:
Coercion and duty can do little specifically to insure that the next generation
receives its “fair share” of human and natural resources. If we continue along in
123
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an unreflective state to create sound institutions for the present, the problem of
future generations will pretty much take care of itself, even if we do not develop
some overarching policies of taxation or investment that target future generations
for special consideration. . . . A classical liberal regime of limited government,
low taxation, personal liberty, and private property benefits future generations
more than an alternative regime that consciously enlists large government to
restrain liberty and to limit the present use of property for the benefit of future
generations. 128
Epstein contends that in order to safeguard the interests of future generations, we can and
should rely upon the natural and genetic pre-dispositions of parents to save for the benefit
of, and to otherwise act in the best interests of, their children. Historically, Epstein
contends, reliance on (and non-interference with) such natural predispositions has
allowed future generations to receive benefits from past generations that “far exceed the
level of transfers stipulated under any of the standard theories of justice between
generations.” 129
Epstein, however, seems to acknowledge that this laissez-faire approach to
intergenerational savings may not suffice to generate the proper amount of savings with
respect to intellectual property. First, in shifting the focus of his discussion from the
subject of real property to intellectual property, he explicitly acknowledges the
importance of the public domain traditionally carved out by intellectual property law for
the benefit of future generations of creators. 130 Although he does not specifically address
the desirability of a private ordering regime in which creators are able to create unlimited
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rights for themselves, he does recognize the benefits that the existing public ordering
regime provides to subsequent generations of creators. 131 Furthermore, his reliance upon
parents’ genetic predisposition to save for the benefit of their children does not apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the relationships among successive “generations” of creators. That
is to say, although we might be justified in relying upon Johann Sebastian Bach and
Woodie Guthrie to set aside financial nest-eggs for Johann Christian and Arlo,
respectively, we would be unjustified in relying solely upon these parents’ genetic
predispositions to set aside portions of their creative works for the benefit of future
generations of creators generally. Thus, Epstein’s analysis cannot justify reliance on a
system of unlimited rights in creative works -- such as those increasingly made possible
by technological and contractual private ordering measures -- to protect the interests of
successive generations of creators.
In sum, in Parts I and II, I have argued that intergenerational justice obligations
applied to systems of rights in creative works justify imposing limitations on authors’
rights in creative works in order to protect the rights of all authors. Whether applying
Rawlsian deontological principles or utilitarian principles of distributive justice, authors
deliberating behind a veil of ignorance that obscured from them information as to which
generation they belonged would opt for limited rights in creative works and for the
concomitant savings of portions of creative works for the benefit of future generations of
authors.

III.
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Copyright law grants rights to authors in order to advance its constitutionallymandated utilitarian purpose. 132 Property rights are granted to authors not in reward for
their labor, but in furtherance of copyright law’s utilitarian mandate of advancing the
creative process for the general public good. Utilitarian considerations dictate, however,
that when the rights granted to authors stand as an impediment to advancing the societal
creative process, such rights must be limited in order to advance the greatest (creative)
good for the greatest number. Accordingly, copyright rights are always contingent upon
whether such rights continue to serve the ultimate societal good of advancing the creative
process. Consistent with its utilitarian mandate, copyright law grants rights to authors in
order to stimulate the creative process, but limits those rights where necessary to avoid
impeding the creative process.
Although the limitations on authors’ copyright rights have historically been
understood to advance copyright law’s utilitarian purpose, such limitations also constitute
a form of mandated intergenerational savings imposed on each generation of authors for
the benefit of future generations of authors. Although Congress and the courts have not
explicitly adverted to principles of intergenerational justice in justifying limitations on
creators’ rights, such themes can be seen to inhere in the jurisprudence of copyright
limitations. In myriad circumstances in which authors have sought to wield their
exclusive rights in ways that would fail to preserve the raw materials of the creative
process for subsequent generations of authors to build upon, copyright law has imposed
significant limitations on creators’ rights. Because present authors acting in their own
interests do not have sufficient incentive to “save” for the benefit of future authors,
132
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copyright law has traditionally mandated the savings of certain elements and uses of
authors’ creative works for the benefit of future authors. Below I explore the ways in
which copyright law’s limitations on authors’ rights both advance the utilitarian purpose
of promoting the creative process for the greater public good and enforce obligations of
intergenerational justice between authors.
First, an author’s copyright monopoly lasts only for a limited time, 133 in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of a limited copyright term. 134 Thus, in
contrast to real property rights, intellectual property rights in creative works are
constitutionally required to be of limited duration. Second, copyright protection is only
available for certain types of works and certain elements within such works. 135 Finally,
certain uses of works that are protected by copyright – even of the protectible elements of
these works – fall outside of a copyright holder’s exclusive rights and are privileged as
fair uses of such works. 136 Below I briefly describe each of these limitations, which have
been explored elsewhere in the literature. 137
A. Works For Which The Copyright Term Has Expired
An important limitation on copyright rights is the durational limit imposed by the
term of copyright protection. 138 In accordance with the explicit constitutional mandate in
the Copyright Clause, 139 property rights in works of authorship are required to be of
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See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
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limited duration. Because of such durational limits on copyright rights, works of
authorship from the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and early Twentieth Centuries in their
entireties are within the “public domain” and can be freely used by subsequent authors.
Because such works are no longer protected by copyright, future authors can make any
and all uses of works such as Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, Charlie Chaplin’s film The
Tramp, or Mahler’s Second Symphony. Although the term of copyright protection has
expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, 140 the constitutionally-required limited
term of copyright protection ensures that, at some point, earlier authors’ works will pass
into the public domain where they can be freely and fully used by other authors and
incorporated into future creative works. 141
B. Unprotected Elements of Copyrighted Works
A second fundamental limitation imposed by copyright law on creators’ rights
encompasses those elements of otherwise copyrightable works that are excluded from the
scope of an author’s monopoly. In myriad court decisions throughout the past centuries,
courts have expressly withheld certain elements of otherwise copyrightable works from
the exclusive control of authors. These unprotectable elements include primarily facts, 142
which are not original to the author and are therefore not properly included as part of a
140

Over the past centuries, this limited term has been extended from two years, to 14, to 21, to 28,
to 56, to life of the author plus 50 years, to its current length of life of the author plus 70 years for
individual authors. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at 1.05[A][1]. Constitutional challenges to the
recent expansion of the copyright term by twenty years have been unsuccessful. See Eldred v.
Reno, ___ F.3d ___ (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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As Wendy Gordon contends, “if perpetual property existed in all intangibles, many creators
would have to choose between using someone else’s property without permission, or forgoing
creation of their own. . . . For new creators to flourish, they must be able to draw on an array of
prior creations that are not privately owned.” Gordon, supra note 87, at 1557.
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See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any . . . discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in a work."); Feist v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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creator’s rights qua creator, and ideas and ideational elements, 143 which – even if
ostensibly created by the author -- are deemed to fall outside the scope of the author’s
monopoly under the judicially crafted “idea/expression dichotomy.” 144
In developing the idea/expression dichotomy, courts have attempted to draw a
boundary between the underlying ideas on which a work is based and an author’s
particular expression of such ideas, and have held that the ideas themselves – including
such ideational elements as stock characters, general themes, or plots 145 contained within
works – are not within the scope of the author’s monopoly. Copyright law dictates that
these latter components of works of authorship be dedicated to the public domain and
cannot be rendered subject to the private control of any one author. 146 Under the doctrine
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See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); ROBERT A.
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See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954)
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protection afforded by the copyright"), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955); Nichols v. Universal
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In addition to preserving the raw materials of the creative process in the public domain, the
idea/expression dichotomy also advances important First Amendment values. In particular,
because copyright law’s idea/expression dichotomy prohibits authors from monopolizing the
ideas embodied in their works, copyright law ensures that members of the public are allowed to
communicate freely and build upon such ideas (so long as they do not appropriate the precise
form in which the ideas were conveyed by the original author). The Supreme Court has
explained that "[c]opyright's idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of [uncopyrightable
material such as ideas and] facts, while still protecting an author's expression." Harper & Row
Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). Extending an author's exclusive
rights to the ideas embodied in her work would frustrate the creative enterprise, and impinge upon
core First Amendment values by restricting the expression of ideas. Thus, the idea/expression
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of the idea/expression dichotomy, copyright law grants authors monopoly rights in the
expression of the ideas embodied in their works, but withholds such monopoly protection
from the underlying ideas themselves. 147 Thus, for example, the copyright owner of the
film Analyze This may prohibit subsequent filmmakers from copying substantial portions
of scenes from the film or from appropriating detailed creative elements from the film,
but cannot prohibit subsequent creators from building upon the idea of a Mafia boss
experiencing panic attacks, seeking psychotherapy, the warring Mafia clans’ response,
etc. 148 Similarly, the owner of the copyright in the film Star Wars can prohibit a
subsequent filmmaker from creating a movie that incorporates and free rides upon
substantial creative elements of Star Wars, but cannot lay exclusive claim to the idea of a
movie involving intergalactic battles. 149
Historically, the copyright statute did not specify which portions of creative works
fell within and which fell without the scope of an author’s monopoly. 150 Yet, as

dichotomy ensures that the ideas embodied in copyrighted works can circulate freely, while
granting copyright owners the right to control their particular expression of their ideas. See
Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. D AYTON L. REV. 587,
604 (1997). As Neil Netanel explains in his discussion of the role of copyright in a democratic
society, in order for citizens to participate in a rich cultural, social, and political life, they must
have wide latitude to express and reformulate ideas embodied in copyrighted expression. See Neil
Netanel, Copyright in a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996). In the words of
pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, in order for citizens to formulate and articulate their interests
and preferences on public issues, they must "have access to the rich store of the accumulated
wealth of mankind in ideas, knowledge, and purposes." JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL
ACTION 52 (1963), quoted in Netanel, supra, at 349 & n.302.
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Significantly, if an idea can only be expressed in one or a limited number of ways, copyright
law resolves this issue of whether to extend protection to the idea and its expression in favor of
the public, by refusing to grant copyright protection to expression that "merges" with the idea it
embodies. See, e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir.
1990).
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copyright holders brought infringement actions seeking to exercise broad exclusive rights
in their works in order to prohibit subsequent creators from building upon their works,
the courts responded by developing the idea/expression dichotomy. 151 Over the years, the
courts developed a jurisprudence of limitations on authors’ rights by articulating those
aspects of copyrightable works that were properly subject to authors’ exclusive control
and those that were not. Largely through the vehicle of the idea/expression dichotomy,
courts declined to allow authors to exercise exclusive control over the broad outlines of
their plots, themes, characters, and literary devices. 152
The famous Learned Hand opinion of Nichols v. Universal Pictures 153 illustrates
the judicial role in curtailing authors’ rights in order to protect the interests of subsequent
authors. The plaintiff in Nichols authored a play entitled Abie’s Irish Rose, involving a
Jewish family and an Irish Catholic family whose children fall in love, secretly marry,
and raise a family. Plaintiff alleged copyright infringement by the author of the
subsequently created play The Cohens and The Kellys, also involving a Jewish family and
an Irish Catholic family whose children fall in love, secretly marry, and raise a family.
Ruling on plaintiff’s claim that his copyright was infringed because defendant’s play
borrowed the above-described broad plot lines, themes, and characters, Judge Learned
Hand held that the elements appropriated by defendant were not properly within the
scope of plaintiff’s copyright. Rather, Judge Hand explained, such broad themes, stock
characters, situations and plots were all no more than plaintiff’s ideas, broadly speaking,
which could not be privatized by plaintiff. Courts have also extended the
151

See, e.g., id. (“When copyright owners brought lawsuits asserting broad claims of ownership,
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Id. at 978-92.

56

idea/expression dichotomy to other types of works of authorship, including technological
works such as software programs, and have held that only the expression of ideas, but not
the ideas embodied within the software, are protectible by copyright. 154
In short, Congress and the courts have carved out several ideational components
of copyrightable works and excluded these elements from the scope of authors’ rights,
and have in the process rejected authors’ attempts to prohibit subsequent authors from
building upon such components in creating their own works.
C. Fair Use of Copyrighted Works
Copyright law’s fair use doctrine also serves to impose substantial limitations on
authors’ rights. While an author's copyright monopoly allows her to prohibit others from
copying substantial portions of her work for competing commercial purposes, copyright
law does not confer upon her the right to prevent others from copying her work (or
portions thereof) for certain transformative, critical, and educational uses, among others.
Over the years, in establishing the contours of the fair use doctrine, Congress and the
courts 155 have carved out a host of exceptions to the exclusive rights granted to authors,
including exceptions for subsequent uses such as "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . . , scholarship or research."156 In applying a variation of the analysis of the
interests and incentives operating upon authors in the original position, courts have
153
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justified the fair use doctrine on a theory of hypothetical or implied consent. In justifying
the limitations imposed on authors’ rights by the fair use doctrine, for example, the
Supreme Court explained in Harper & Row that:
The author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works has
always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the
constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from
attempting to improve upon prior works and thus frustrate the very ends
sought to be attained [i.e., the promotion of the progress of science and the
useful arts]. 157
The fair use doctrine thus “permits courts to avoid rigid application of [the copyright
holder’s exclusive rights] where it would stifle the very creativity which the law is
designed to foster.” 158 Thus, under the fair use doctrine, if I were writing a book about
the treatment of the mafia by Hollywood, I would likely be entitled under the fair use
doctrine to incorporate a portion of the dialogue from the film The Godfather. If I were
preparing a critical review or lampoon of Star Wars, I would be entitled to incorporate
several clips from the film into my review.
It will be helpful for my purposes to classify types of fair uses into the following
categories: (1) uses deemed fair because they are transformative and productive; (2) uses
deemed fair in order to overcome earlier authors’ desire to avoid criticism; and (3) uses
deemed fair purely to overcome logistical barriers to market formation. An example of
the first is a biographer’s use of quotations from letters or journals written by the subject

(exemptions for library photocopying, certain public performances, reproduction for the blind and
disabled).
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of the biography. 159 The subsequent author’s use of such quotations in creating her own
work is transformative and advances copyright law’s goals of promoting the creative
process, 160 despite the fact that the copyright owner of the letters or journals might refuse
to license their use. This category of fair uses also encompasses more diffusely
transformative uses, like educational, research, and scientific uses, which ultimately tend
to be transformative in that they lead to the promotion of the progress of science and the
useful arts. An example of the second category is the fair use exception traditionally
extended to works such as critical reviews and parodies that quote passages from the
works they are criticizing. 161 Because of the author’s endemic refusal to license certain
types of works that would reflect negatively upon her work – despite the fact that the
subsequent use would advance the societal interest in the creative process – the fair use
doctrine steps in to compel a (royalty-free) license between the author of the earlier work
and the author of the subsequent work. 162
An example of the third category of fair uses includes those types of uses that
would likely be licensed if the earlier and later authors were brought to the bargaining
table and negotiations over the terms of the use were facilitated. For example, if a
commercial lecturer wished to prepare a handout that included a reproduction of one
159

See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (biographer of novelist
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Gordon, supra note 138, at 1633.
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paragraph from an obscure but copyright-protected journal, and if despite her efforts, the
lecturer were unable to locate and secure permission from the copyright owner for such
use, the fair use doctrine might be interpreted to permit such use. 163 Because the
lecturer’s cost of transacting with the copyright owner over permission to reproduce the
paragraph would likely exceed the benefits of transacting, 164 in the absence of a privilege,
such use would not go forward and society as a whole would be worse off. The fair use
doctrine incorporates recognition of the fact that, because of such logistical impediments
to negotiation and bargaining over such uses, unless such socially valuable subsequent
uses were privileged, they would likely not take place. This third category of fair use
thus reflects a fact about the state of the world in which transacting over non-substantial
uses of prior works is often prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. The difference
between the result reached by the fair use doctrine and that which likely would have been
reached by an agreement between the parties is, of course, the absence of a licensing fee.
Because this last category of fair uses is dependent upon the presence of transactions
costs that impose logistical barriers to market formation -- primarily the cost of locating
and negotiating with authors of prior creative works 165 -- to the extent that these types of
transactions costs are reduced in the digital realm, 166 the justifications for this type of fair
use may not survive the migration of creative works to the digital realm.
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In short, copyright law imposes significant limitations on authors’ exclusive rights
in their works of authorship. By means of limitations on the term and scope of copyright
protection, and the exceptions to authors' copyright monopoly carved out by the fair use
doctrine, copyright law preserves for future authors the raw materials necessary to
facilitate the creative enterprise in the long run. While protecting the ultimate harvest of
an author's creative efforts, copyright law also protects "the seed and the substance of this
harvest."167 Although the limitations on authors’ rights are imposed primarily to advance
copyright law’s utilitarian purpose, these limitations also serve to mandate the savings of
creative works for the benefit of future generations of authors and thus also advance
concerns of intergenerational justice.
IV. PRIVATE O RDERING OF R IGHTS IN CREATIVE WORKS
The balance between rights granted to authors and the limitations on those rights
traditionally embodied in copyright law is currently experiencing a tectonic shift, driven
by forces from within and without copyright law. From within, copyright law was
recently amended to provide a new type of right to copyright holders and to restructure
the rights and privileges historically enjoyed by creators and members of the public. The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 168 recognizes the right of authors to privately order
their creative rights and to privately enforce these rights by means of technological
measures -- such as encryption and password controls -- that control access to and
copying of works. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) also grants authors
the right to enforce these rights through the judicial system, should their private
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enforcement mechanisms fail. 169 One important creative industry – the major motion
picture industry – has begun to exploit its new rights under the DMCA and to employ
technology to prohibit all unauthorized access to and copying of motion pictures released
in DVD format. 170 Reeling from its battles with Napster, the music industry is also
starting to use encryption technology in an attempt to prevent digital music files from
being copied. 171 By using technological measures to prohibit unauthorized access to and
copying of their works, the copyright owners of such films are curtailing the privileges
historically enjoyed by members of the public under copyright law, as discussed below.
The historical balance between authors’ rights and the limitations on these rights
is also undergoing a substantial shift set into motion by forces outside copyright law, in
the form of major revisions in the contract law regime governing the licensing of
electronic works. Authors of such works are now able to expand their copyright and
copyright-like rights, while contracting users’ privileges, by means of contractual terms
that bind all those making use of such works. 172 E-book authors are increasingly using
clickwrap licenses to create exclusive rights in their works, rights that admit of no
limitations analogous to those imposed by copyright law. In one of the more extreme
examples of private ordering in the digital realm, Glassbook’s e-book version of Lewis
Carroll’s classic Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland contained terms that prohibited the
copying or printing of any of the text or the reading aloud from the text. 173 Below I
explore both technological and contractual private ordering mechanisms now available to
169
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authors for circumventing the limitations traditionally imposed on authors’ rights under
copyright law, as well as the consequences of such circumvention.
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and The Private Ordering
of Rights in Creative Works
In the early years of the digital age, certain authors of digital works were
concerned that copyright law, as then constituted, would not be up to the task of
controlling illegal copying of their works. These authors feared that, because of the ease
with which copies could be made of digital works, copyright law would be ineffectual in
controlling the widespread and near instantaneous copying of their works. 174 One
proffered solution to such problems was to enable authors to take matters into their own
hands by the use of technological measures to control unauthorized access to and copying
of their works in digital form, and to have their right to use such technological measures
protected by law. These interests prevailed both in the national forum, as reflected in by
the Clinton Administration’s 1995 NII White Paper, 175 as well as in the international
forum, in the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright
Treaty. 176 To implement the United States’ obligations under the WIPO Copyright
Treaty, in 1998 Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, thereby enacting
the “most sweeping revisions ever” 177 to the Copyright Act of 1976.
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1. DMCA and The Private Ordering of Access Controls and Copy Controls
Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act essentially recognizes authors’
rights to use technological measures to establish and enforce the terms on which their
works can be accessed and copied (if at all), thereby countenancing authors’ ability to
privately order their rights in their works. The DMCA also grants authors the right to
seek judicial recourse when and if their technological measures controlling access and
copying are compromised. And in enforcing authors’ new “paracopyright” right against
circumvention of access control measures, courts are not permitted to take into account
the traditional limitations on authors’ rights imposed by the fair use doctrine. 178 DMCA
thereby creates a new copyright-like right for authors – the right to technologically
control access to their work and to prohibit circumvention of such technologies -- and
exempts this right from certain limitations traditionally imposed on authors’ rights for the
benefit of future authors.
In analyzing the operation of the provisions embodied in Section 1201 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, it will first be helpful to explore the distinction set
forth in this section between what we may call “access control” devices 179 and “copy
control” devices. 180 An access control device is a device, such as an encryption or
178

See Nimmer, supra note 177, at 739.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (A “technological measure ‘effectively controls access to a
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distribute to the public, or publicly perform or display. Some have argued that this definition
incorporates fair use limitations, because the rights of a copyright owner, as set forth in Section
106, are expressly made subject to the limitations set forth in Section 107, Limitations on
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password system, that controls access to a copyrighted work. For example, the owner of
the copyright in a motion picture might release the film for home viewing only on DVD
and prohibit unauthorized access to the film stored on DVD by means of encryption
technology. 181 Or, the author of a novel might release it only in electronic form via the
Internet and control access to the story by means of password controls. 182 Both types of
controls would be considered technological measures that effectively control access to a
work, 183 or “access control devices” for short. A copy control device is a device that
restricts the reproduction of works protected by copyright 184 (or which restricts the
unauthorized exercise of another of the author’s exclusive copyright rights). 185 For
example, the copyright owner of a film might release the film on DVD and use
encryption or other technological measures to prohibit the copying of any part of the
film. 186 Such technology would be considered a technological measure that effectively
protects the reproduction right of the copyright owner, or a “copy control” device for
short. Section 1201 prohibits both (1) the circumvention of access control devices
protecting a work, and (2) the making available to the public (and/or other types of
“trafficking in”) devices designed either to circumvent access controls or copy controls.
As of October 28, 2000, Section 1201 prohibits three types of conduct: (1) circumventing
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an access control device protecting a copyrighted work 187 ; (2) “trafficking in” devices
primarily designed to circumvent access controls 188 ; (3) “trafficking in” devices primarily
designed to circumvent copy controls. 189
As an example of access and copy control devices used by authors to privately
order their rights in their works, consider the measures recently taken by the motion
picture industry in conjunction with distributing their films on DVD. Electing not to rely
187
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solely on copyright law’s traditional prohibitions on unauthorized reproduction, public
distribution and display, etc., of works of authorship, the industry supplemented its
traditional copyright rights with technological measures prohibiting unauthorized access
to and copying of all or any part of their films distributed on DVD. 190 In making their
films available on DVD, the motion picture distributors have employed an encryptionbased access control and copy prevention system, known as the Contents Scramble
System (CSS), to control access to and prohibit the copying of all or any part of films
distributed on DVD. 191 When the CSS was subsequently compromised by a decryption
program known as DeCSS, the film distributors successfully brought suit under Section
1201 of the DMCA against those who made DeCSS available to the public, in the case of
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes. 192
The defendants in Reimerdes claimed that the distribution of a program that
circumvented plaintiffs’ access control and copy control devices was necessary to enable
members of the public to exercise the fair use rights they have historically enjoyed. 193
Defendants contended that plaintiffs’ use of technological measures to assert unlimited
exclusive rights in their works was inconsistent with the limitations on rights historically
imposed under the Copyright Act. The Reimerdes court held, however, that because
plaintiffs were not seeking vindication of their traditional – and traditionally limited –
copyright rights, but of their newly-created anti-circumvention rights under Section 1201
of the Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine did not serve to limit plaintiffs’ rights in their
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works. 194 Rejecting the argument that the use of the DeCSS decryption program was
necessary to enable members of the public to exercise their fair use rights with respect to
motion pictures stored in encrypted form on DVDs, the court held that the fair use
doctrine did not provide a defense to a Section 1201 violation.
As the Reimerdes case demonstrates, authors can now employ technological
measures in exercise of their rights under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to
prevent any and all copying of their works and to prohibit all but paid and licensed access
to such works. And authors who employ such technological measures are entitled under
Section 1201 to call upon the courts to protect their privately ordered rights when their
technological measures of doing so fail. As scenarios like that presented in the
Reimerdes case become more and more common, the issue is squarely raised of the
continued significance of and need for the limitations that copyright law has historically
imposed on authors’ rights. Although Congress may have intended, in passing the
DMCA, to “extend[] into the digital environment the bedrock principle of ‘balance’ in
American intellectual property law for the benefit of both copyright owners and users,” 195
it is far from clear that this intention was effectuated.
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and The Fair Use Doctrine
An analysis of whether and how well the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
extends into the digital realm the fair use rights and other traditional limitations on
authors’ exclusive rights is a complex one. In crafting the DMCA’s anti-circumvention
and anti-trafficking provisions and the exceptions thereto, Congress undertook efforts to
preserve some types of fair uses for some types of communities in some types of works
194
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of authorship. First, several narrowly-crafted exceptions are available to Section
1201(a)(1)’s provision barring circumvention of access controls for certain “formal fair
use communities.” 196 For example, Section 1201 grants non-profit libraries, archives,
and educational institutions the right to circumvent access controls on copyrighted works
solely in order to -- and only for as long as necessary to -- determine whether they wish to
purchase a legitimate authorized copy of the access-controlled work. 197 This exemption
is only available if the access-controlled work is not reasonably available in another form.
Thus, if a library sought to determine whether to purchase a copy of Stephen King’s latest
novel released in encrypted form on his web site, the library could lawfully circumvent
such encryption access controls for so long as it took to determine whether it wished to
purchase an authorized copy of the novel, only if the novel were not available in
unprotected (hard copy) format, and, importantly, only if the means for circumventing
such access controls were available to it. 198
Second, Section 1201 grants users a right to circumvent access controls in order to
reverse engineer a computer program, solely in order to identify and analyze the elements
of the program necessary to achieve interoperability with other programs. 199 Individuals
are also permitted to develop (and “traffic in” 200 ) technology to circumvent technological
measures used to reverse engineer computer programs in order to achieve
interoperability. 201 Thus, in the special context of computer programs, users are granted
the privilege of circumventing access controls in order to access the unprotectable ideas

196

See Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 153.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d).
198
Id.
199
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
200
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2).
201
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2),(3).
197

69

embedded within the computer programs, 202 and developers are granted the privilege of
developing technologies to enable users to do so. Further, certain types of encryption
research activities are exempted from the reach of the anti-circumvention provision, and
the development of technology facilitating such research activities is exempted from the
reach of the anti-trafficking provision, 203 where such acts are conducted to advance the
state of knowledge in the field of encryption. 204
In addition to providing the above narrowly-circumscribed fair use exemptions in
deference to formal fair use communities and in response to scientific research and
development needs, Congress also embedded a “fail-safe” mechanism205 into Section
1201 with the intention of accommodating on an ongoing basis the fair use rights of a
broader range of communities. Under this fail-safe mechanism, Section 1201(a)(1)’s
prohibition on the circumvention of access controls will not apply to “persons who are
users of a copyrighted work which is in a particular class or works if [the Librarian of
Congress206 determines that] such persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding three
year period, adversely affected by virtue of [the anti-circumvention] prohibition in their
ability to make non-infringing uses of that particular class of works . . . .” 207 That is, if
the Librarian of Congress determines that Section 1201’s provisions prohibiting
circumvention of access controls have or will likely have an adverse effect on users’
ability to make non-infringing uses of a particular class of copyrighted works, the
Librarian can exempt that class of works from the reach of the anti-circumvention
202
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provision for three years. 208 For example, if the Librarian of Congress were to determine
that users of audiovisual operatic works were adversely affected by the anticircumvention provision, the Librarian could exempt this class of works from the
provision’s reach. Thus far, the Librarian has only exempted two very narrowly drawn
classes of works from the reach of the anti-circumvention provision. 209 Thus, for the vast
majority of users and with respect to the vast majority of copyrighted works, no fair use
limitations apply to Section 1201’s anti-circumvention provision. 210
Defenders of Section 1201’s regime will note that this section only prohibits
circumventing access control devices and does not prohibit circumventing copy control
devices. If a user has or somehow gains access to a work subject to copy controls, she is
not prohibited by Section 1201 from circumventing these copy controls -- assuming she
has a technological means of doing so – in order to make fair use type copies of the work.
Furthermore, Section 1201 specifically recognizes that “nothing in this section shall
affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair
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use, under this title.” 211 The Copyright Office, in its summary of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 212 explains that the absence of a direct prohibition on circumventing copy
controls to parallel the prohibition on circumventing access controls was intended “to
assure that the public will have the continued ability to make fair use of copyrighted
works. Since copying of a work may be a fair use under appropriate circumstances,
Section 1201 does not prohibit the act of circumventing a technological measure that
prevents copying.” 213 But, as discussed below, the privilege of circumventing copy
controls will likely ring hollow: because the Act does prohibit trafficking in devices
designed to circumvent copy controls, 214 it is likely that users will not have sufficient
means available to them to circumvent such copy controls and to exercise their privilege
of making fair use copies.
To understand the effect of Section 1201’s prohibitions, consider more closely the
use of the Contents Scramble System by motion picture distributors to control
unauthorized access to and copying of films released on DVDs in the context of the
following scenarios: (1) Scenario One: in 2001, several blockbuster hits are released only
on DVDs protected by the Contents Scramble System; (2) Scenario Two: the classic
Charlie Chaplin film The Tramp, which has fallen into the public domain, is released on
CSS-protected DVD with a new (and copyright-protected 215 ) introduction; and (3)
Scenario Three: a never before released Charlie Chaplin film from 1922 is released (with
a new introduction) only on CSS-protected DVD. Below I explore the effect of Section
211
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1201’s prohibitions on a hypothetical cinema professor, Carla, who seeks to exercise her
traditional fair use rights with respect to the films in each of these scenarios.
With respect to Scenario One, Carla wishes to conduct a lecture on the
blockbuster hits of 2001, including those released only on DVD, and to create an
associated montage of relevant clips from such films. Is it possible, as a technological
and as a legal matter, for her to do so? First, although she is not prohibited by Section
1201 from circumventing the DVD’s copy controls to copy portions of films stored on
DVD, she is prohibited by Section 1201(a)(1) from circumventing the DVD’s access
controls. Software such as DeCSS which defeats the Contents Scramble System
circumvents both its access and copy controls; 216 therefore, it is illegal to make such
technology available to the public under Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1). 217 But let
us suppose that Carla had a compliant DVD player and a legitimate DVD of each film
from which she wishes to copy in creating her montage, so that she need not circumvent
the CSS access controls. Would she be able to defeat CSS’s copy controls in order to
make fair use copies of the blockbuster films released only on DVD? As a legal matter,
under 1201, the answer is yes; Section 1201 does not prohibit the circumvention of copy
controls. As a practical matter, the answer is, probably not. In order to defeat CSS’s
copy controls and make a digital copy of portions of the films stored on DVD, she would
need some technological means of circumventing these copy controls. But it is illegal to
“traffic in” technology that circumvents copy controls. 218
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If Carla cannot legally secure technology to circumvent CSS’s copy controls so
as to make digital copies of portions of the films stored on DVD, her only alternative for
making fair use copies of the DVDs would be to develop such circumvention technology
herself. Recall that it is only a violation to traffic in such copy-control defeating
technology, not to use such copy-control defeating technology (and presumably, not to
create such technology for one’s own use). But it is highly unlikely that Carla and those
similarly situated will be able to develop such sophisticated encryption technologydefeating technologies by themselves. Thus, the net effect of Section 1201’s prohibitions
is to leave users like Carla who are not technologically sophisticated enough to create
their own circumvention devices with no means of exercising their traditional fair use
rights with respect to works protected by copy-control devices. As the Reimerdes court
explained in ruling on the applicability of the fair use defense to defendant’s Section
1201 violation, in enacting the DMCA, “Congress elected to leave technologically
unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted works without a means
of doing so.” 219

(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner
under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that
person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or
a portion thereof.
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It might be responded that Carla should not complain because and to the extent
that she can always make non-digital fair uses of the films released exclusively on DVDs.
For example, she could simply transcribe, or make an analog audio copy from the speaker
output of, the dialogue she wishes to lecture on, or she could take a still picture or analog
video tape of the monitor of the DVD player, etc. As the Reimerdes court observed, “of
course, one might quote the verbal portion of the soundtrack, rerecord both verbal and
non-verbal portions of the soundtrack [of a copy-controlled DVD], and videotape or
otherwise record images produced on a monitor when the DVD is played on a compliant
DVD player.” 220 Such limited privileges, however, fail to secure for Carla the right to
make digital fair uses of creative works. In essence, the fair use privilege that is
preserved for Carla and users like her in the digital realm is the privilege of making
analog uses of digital works, a privilege that will ring hollow with the progressive
migration of creative works to the digital realm.
The end result of Section 1201’s prohibitions on the act of circumvention and on
the “trafficking in” circumvention technologies is that prospective authors will essentially
be prohibited from making digital fair uses of technologically-protected works of
authorship, and will be unable to carry forth into the digital realm the fair use rights that
they have historically enjoyed in the pre-digital realm. In passing the DMCA in an effort
to prevent the unfair copying of digital works, Congress also has essentially prohibited
the fair copying of digital works protected by technological measures.
Next consider Scenarios Two and Three, in which Carla wishes to exercise the
privileges traditionally granted to her by copyright law with respect to the public domain
Chaplin films released, each with a new introduction, on a CSS-protected DVD. Because
220
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the underlying films themselves are no longer protected by copyright, Carla enjoys the
legal right under the Copyright Act to make whatever uses she pleases of the films. But
because the films, packaged with their added introductions, are protected by copyright 221
and because the DVDs on which the films are stored are protected by copy control
devices, under the analysis set forth above, Carla would be unable to make any digital
copies of the film and would be required to resort to making analog copies or copying an
analog version of the film – if one is available to her. This is especially troubling with
respect to Scenario Three, where the encrypted digital version of the film is the only
version available. By combining a copyrightable introduction with a public domain
work, and then locking up the combined work with access and copy control devices, an
“author” can create virtually unlimited exclusive rights in a largely uncopyrightable
work. Furthermore, the copyright holder in the Chaplin film can use technological
measures to parlay a copyright of limited term into a perpetual right, merely by adding a
new introduction at the end of each copyright term and then locking up the entire work
using access control and copy control devices.
In short, technological measures countenanced by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act used to control access to works of authorship, coupled with the Act’s
prohibitions on trafficking in technology that defeats access and copy control devices,
render fair use limitations on creators’ rights in technologically-protected digital works
essentially meaningless. Furthermore, the Act’s anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking
provisions enable such creators to parlay their durationally limited copyright rights into
unlimited rights in their works. Even though the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
creates exceptions for certain fair use communities and for certain types of fair uses, and
221
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even though the act of circumventing copy control devices is technically not prohibited,
the Act’s anti-trafficking provisions will operate to prohibit most users from exercising
their right to circumvent copy control devices in order to make fair use copies of
technologically-protected works and in order to access public domain elements of
creative works. Section 1201’s countenance of the use of technological measures to
control access to and copying of works, coupled with its ban on trafficking in
circumvention technology, will render users who are not encryption software
developers 222 unable to make fair use digital copies of works or to use the portions of
such works that are unprotected by copyright. Despite the asserted intentions of its
drafters, 223 the Digital Millennium Copyright Act fails to carry forth into the digital realm
the limitations on authors’ rights historically imposed by copyright law. Instead, the
DMCA essentially freezes future authors’ ability to exercise fair use rights within the
analog realm, prevents them from exercising their fair use rights within the digital realm,
and enables present authors to circumvent the durational limits imposed on copyright
rights.
B. Contractual Measures and Private Ordering of Rights in Creative
Works
In addition to using technological measures to control access to and copying of
their works, authors of digital works are also turning to contractual measures to privately
order their rights. For example, authors of electronic books are resorting to contractual
measures to establish virtually unlimited rights in their works. Authors such as Stephen
King are using contractual measures to control uses of their own works, while others are
222
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using such measures to create for themselves rights in public domain works. Glassbook’s
e-book of Lewis Carroll’s classic Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, for example, comes
with terms prohibiting the copying, printing, or reading aloud of the work. 224 The use of
such contractual measures, like the use of technological measures, enables authors to
create rights in their works that are not subject to the limitations historically imposed by
copyright law to advance the societal creative process and to protect the interests of
future authors. Because the topic of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses has been explored
elsewhere in the literature, 225 I will not reiterate the arguments for and against the
enforcement of such license terms here, but will instead briefly outline the salient features
of such licenses and examine the ways in which they can be used to establish rights in
creative works that are not subject to the limitations historically imposed by copyright
law.
Shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses are licenses that establish the terms and
conditions for the use of electronic works. For example, in acquiring a software
program226 or a work of literature 227 over the Internet, a user will likely be required to
agree to the terms and conditions established by the author of such works as a prerequisite to her purchase and use of the work. The terms of such licenses typically
augment the author’s rights and limit the purchaser’s privileges relative to those enjoyed
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by the parties under copyright law. 228 For example, the license terms may prohibit users
from making fair use type copies of the work, 229 or from copying portions of the work
that are unprotectable by copyright, such as the facts or ideas contained within the work –
or, in the case of public domain works, from copying the entire underlying work itself. 230
The license terms may also purport to extend such rights in perpetuity, 231 in contrast to
the limited duration of rights granted to authors under copyright law. Such license terms,
if embedded within the subject works, must be confronted and assented to before
accessing such works, and are therefore binding upon all those who subsequently make
use of such works. For example, the developer of a software program might embed a
license within the program itself so that anyone who operates the program is first made to
agree to the custom license terms governing its use, terms that may prohibit users from
accessing the unprotectable ideas embodied in such works or forbid the reproduction of
other components of the work that are unprotected by copyright, such as facts or data. 232
Interestingly, the Contents Scramble System – the encryption software program used to
control unauthorized access to and copying of films stored on DVDs – is itself governed
by an electronic license that prohibits users from accessing and copying elements of the
program that are unprotected by copyright or from exercising their fair use rights with
respect to the program. 233 And, although contractual provisions generally have limited
effect in that they bind only those who are parties to the contract, in the case of embedded
licenses, there are no relevant non-parties to such licenses, no users of the licensed works
228
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who are not also bound by the relevant license terms. Given the embedded nature of such
licenses, any user is first made to confront and assent to the terms of the embedded
license.
Clickwrap licenses, unlike technological protection measures, are not selfenforcing and therefore the rights created by such licenses must be enforced by the
courts, which have the discretion to refuse to enforce license terms that are overreaching,
inconsistent with fundamental public policies, or that stand as obstacles to the
achievement of copyright law’s objectives. 234 Thus far, however, courts have been
largely sympathetic to efforts by authors to expand their rights via contract. The Seventh
Circuit’s analysis in ProCD v. Zeidenberg is illustrative of courts’ willingness to uphold
shrinkwrap license terms that eviscerate the limitations on authors’ rights traditionally
imposed by copyright law. ProCD involved the enforceability of a clickwrap license
embedded within a software package that contained a database of telephone listings. The
terms of ProCD’s embedded license prohibited the reproduction and distribution of the
elements of the phone directory, even though such elements – because purely factual -were unprotected by copyright. 235 Zeidenberg, who had purchased and used the software
and was therefore required to have assented to its license terms, nevertheless went on to
copy and distribute the contents of the directory in a networked environment in violation
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of the license. 236 In response to ProCD’s breach of contract argument, Zeidenberg
asserted that the subject license terms were preempted by the Copyright Act, which
preempts the enforcement of property-like rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act. 237 The district court credited Zeidenberg’s
argument and held that the license essentially purported to create for ProCD the exclusive
and unlimited right to reproduce and distribute the work, in contravention of copyright
law’s preemption provision. 238 The Seventh Circuit, however, ruled that the license
merely created a bilateral contract right, not a property-like right, and that therefore the
license was not rendered unenforceable by the force of copyright law’s preemption
provision. 239
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in ProCD misunderstands the nature of embedded
licenses and fails to appreciate that embedded licenses can be used to create rights against
the relevant world that are in conflict with the limited rights granted to authors by
copyright law. In attempting to distinguish between property rights created by the
Copyright Act and contract rights created by the license governing the program at issue,
the court observed that “someone who found a copy of [the program] on the street would
not be affected by the shrinkwrap license.” 240 But in setting forth this hypothetical, the
court failed to appreciate that the license at issue was embedded within the software.
Upon inserting the software in one’s disk drive, the first screen that came up would
require the user to assent to the license terms prohibiting such copying or to exit the
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program. Although it is ordinarily the case that a third party to a contract is not bound by
the license’s terms – and that if the original licensee were to give the software to a
stranger on the bus, the stranger would not be bound by the license terms – the same does
not hold true of the embedded license scenario. Absent tampering with the embedded
license – which would be illegal241 – there are no strangers to such license terms: all who
use such works are bound by its terms. Thus, embedded contractual measures used by
authors to privately order their rights in their works create property-like rights that are
good against the (relevant) world, rights which may well conflict with the limited rights
in creative works traditionally granted to authors under copyright law.
Legislatures are following the lead of courts in their willingness to countenance
authors’ use of clickwrap licenses to create unlimited rights for themselves. The muchcriticized 242 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), the latest
instantiation of the much-criticized 243 proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial
Code, provides a comprehensive set of default rules that enable authors of “informational
works” – including works protected by copyright – to use licenses to create rights for
themselves that are not subject to copyright law’s traditional limitations on authors’
rights. For example, authors of certain works are permitted under UCITA’s scheme to
create perpetual rights in their works. 244 And while clickwrap license terms that violate
“fundamental public policies” are supposedly subject to a heightened unconscionability
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standard, 245 it is uncertain whether courts will use such a standard to render
unenforceable license terms requiring users to forgo their fair use rights or rights to
access ideas or other elements of licensed works that are unprotectible by copyright.
In sum, technological measures, such as access-control and copy-control devices
that prohibit the reproduction of all or any part of creative works, along with contractual
measures, such as clickwrap licenses, that require users to forgo the right to make fair
uses of works or to reproduce unprotected elements in creative works, threaten to erode
the limitations that copyright law has traditionally imposed on authors’ rights to advance
the societal creative process and to safeguard the interests of future authors.

V. ENFORCING INTERGENERATIONAL J USTICE B ETWEEN AUTHORS : BUILDING
LIMITATIONS BACK INTO AUTHORS ’ PRIVATELY ORDERED RIGHTS
As I established in Parts I and II, concerns of intergenerational justice between
authors justify mandating the “savings” of certain aspects of creative works for the
benefit of future authors, where the “savings” of such works is translated into limitations
on authors’ rights. Deliberating behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, authors who had
obscured from them information as to which creative generation they would belong upon
leaving the original position would opt for a system of limited rights in creative works.
Authors deliberating under such conditions would conclude that the imposition of such
limitations is necessary to ensure that all generations of authors have available to them
the raw materials required to exercise their creative rights. Copyright law over the
centuries has come to embody limitations on authors’ rights that approximate the savings
of creative works that would be adopted by authors deliberating in the original position,
245
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taking into account the interests and incentives operating upon authors in both earlier and
later creative generations.
The private ordering of authors’ rights -- via technological measures under the
new Digital Millennium Copyright Act and via contractual measures increasingly upheld
by the courts -- fails to carry over into the digital realm the limitations that are justified
under the intergenerational justice analysis. As set forth in Section II(A) above, authors
deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, who knew not which creative generation they
would belong to and who would therefore wish to preserve for all authors the raw
materials necessary to create, would opt for several types of limitations on authors’
rights. In particular, authors deliberating behind the veil would adopt a savings principle
(1) that would permit future authors to make use of the essential raw materials of the
creative process, including ideas and ideational elements embodied in creative works; (2)
that would permit future authors to make transformative uses even of the nonideational
elements of creative works; (3) that would permit future authors to make evaluative uses
of creative works; and possibly (4) that would impose durational limits on rights in
creative works. 246
Courts called upon to enforce rights in creative works established via
technological and contractual measures should recognize the continued importance of
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logistical barriers to a later author’s negotiation with an earlier author, the royalty-free licenses
mandated under copyright law’s fair use doctrine may no longer be justified in the digital realm.
But the justifications for other types of fair uses – including transformative and evaluative uses of
earlier works – survive the migration of works to the digital realm.
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limiting authors’ rights for the benefit of future authors in the private ordering regime as
they have in the publicly ordered copyright regime. Toward that end, the right granted to
authors under Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to prohibit the
circumvention of technological measures used to control access to creative works should
be limited in the interests of future generations of authors. Courts should construe the
Section 1201 right to control access to one’s work to be subject to the four types of
limitations on authors’ rights identified above. Specifically, courts should carve out a fair
use type exception for those who circumvent technological protection measures in order
to access the ideational components of protected works, to make transformative or
evaluative uses of such works, or to access components of the works that are
unprotectible by copyright. Second, courts should construe Section 1201’s prohibitions
on trafficking in access-control and copy-control defeating technologies to permit the
making available of technologies to facilitate the circumvention of access-control and
copy-control devices where necessary to allow users to access ideas and ideational
elements embodied in such works, to allow users to make transformative or evaluative
uses of such works, and to allow users to access the public domain content contained
within technologically protected works.
Finally, courts construing contractual measures that expand authors’ rights
relative to the rights granted under copyright law should strike down provisions that stand
as obstacles to the enforcement of copyright law’s objectives – viz., promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts and advancing the societal creative process by
protecting the interests of future generations of authors. In states implementing the
UCITA, courts should construe UCITA’s “violation of public policy” language broadly
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to strike down contractual provisions that fail to preserve for future authors the raw
materials of the creative process or that are otherwise not limited in accordance with the
intergenerational justice analysis set forth above.
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